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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we present two novel methods for supervised anomaly
detection. The first method "K-Means+ID3" performs supervised anomaly detection by
partitioning the training data instances into k clusters using Euclidean distance similarity.
Then, on each cluster representing a density region of normal or anomaly instances, an
ID3 decision tree is built. The ID3 decision tree on each cluster refines the decision
boundaries by learning the subgroups within a cluster. To obtain a final decision on
detection, the k-Means and ID3 decision trees are combined using two rules: (1) the
nearest neighbor rule and (2) the nearest consensus rule. The performance of the KMeans+ID3 is demonstrated over three data sets: (1) network anomaly data, (2) Duffing
equation data, and (3) mechanical system data, which contain measurements drawn from
three distinct application domains of computer networks, an electronic circuit
implementing a forced Duffing equation, and a mechanical mass beam system subjected
to fatigue stress, respectively. Results show that the detection accuracy of the KMeans+ID3 method is as high as 96.24 percent on network anomaly data; the total
accuracy is as high as 80.01 percent on mechanical system data; and 79.9 percent on
Duffing equation data. Further, the performance of K-Means+ID3 is compared with
individual k-Means and ID3 methods implemented for anomaly detection.

in

iv
The second method "dependence tree based anomaly detection" performs
supervised anomaly detection using the Bayes classification rule. The class conditional
probability densities in the Bayes classification rule are approximated by dependence
trees, which represent second-order product approximations of probability densities. We
derive the theoretical relationship between dependence tree classification error and Bayes
error rate and show that the dependence tree approximation minimizes an upper bound on
the Bayes error rate. To improve the classification performance of dependence tree based
anomaly detection, we use supervised and unsupervised Maximum Relevance Minimum
Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection method to select a set of features that optimally
characterize class information. We derive the theoretical relationship between the Bayes
error rate and the MRMR feature selection criterion and show that MRMR feature
selection criterion minimizes an upper bound on the Bayes error rate. The performance of
the dependence tree based anomaly detection method is demonstrated on the benchmark
KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection data set. Results show that the detection accuracies of
the dependence tree based anomaly detection method are as high as 99.76 percent in
detecting normal traffic, 93.88 percent in detecting denial-of-service attacks, 94.88
percent in detecting probing attacks, 86.40 percent in detecting user-to-root attacks, and
24.44 percent in detecting remote-to-login attacks. Further, the performance of
dependence tree based anomaly detection method is compared with the performance of
naive Bayes and ID3 decision tree methods as well as with the performance of two
anomaly detection methods reported in recent literature.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection is the process of identifying unusual events occurring in a
system by analyzing the audit data generated from monitoring the system's activities.
Some examples of a "system" include a computer host running several software
applications, a computer network comprising hundreds of nodes, an electronic circuit
implementing arithmetic operations, and a mechanical mass beam structure under fatigue
stress. Some examples of "unusual events" include unexpected behaviors of software
applications (e.g., sudden shutdowns, memory and buffer overflows, etc.) in the case of a
computer host, unexpected bursts in TCP/IP traffic passing through a computer network,
unexpected response measurement from an electronic circuit, and the occurrence of an
evolving crack in a mass beam structure.
Based on the past research activity in anomaly detection, anomaly detection can
be broadly classified into (1) supervised anomaly detection, and (2) unsupervised
anomaly detection. In supervised anomaly detection, the types of anomalies that may
occur in a system are known a priori. Therefore, the problem of supervised anomaly
detection becomes that of identifying whether an event is an anomaly, and if it is, then the
specific type of anomaly to which it belongs. On the other hand, in unsupervised anomaly
detection, the types of anomalies that may occur are largely unknown. Therefore, a
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typical approach to solve the unsupervised anomaly detection problem is to build a
profile of normal behavior of the system and then identify all events that significantly
deviate from the normal profile as anomalies.
Recently, new forms of anomaly detection employing data mining techniques [1],
called Anomaly Detection using Data Mining (ADDM) methods, have emerged in the
literature. ADDM methods perceive the anomaly detection problem as a data
classification problem in which data instances, representing events, are classified as
normal or as anomalies. To classify data instances, ADDM methods employ a wide range
of data mining and machine learning techniques like neural networks [2][3], decision
trees [4], support vector machines [5], fuzzy logic [6], symbolic dynamics [7][8], selforganizing maps [9], Markov chain models [10], discrete Markov models [11], and
association rules [12]. ADDM methods have gained popularity in both supervised and
unsupervised anomaly detection fields because of their abilities to (1) automatically
extract anomaly signatures, (2) detect new anomalies, (3) maintain high detection
accuracies with low false positive rates, and (4) scale on large distributed datasets.
In this dissertation, we present two supervised anomaly detection methods: (1) the
K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection method and (2) the dependence tree based anomaly
detection method. Both methods build on existing data mining methods (i.e., k-Means
clustering, ID3 decision tree learning, and dependence tree approximations of joint
probability densities) and therefore can be classified as ADDM methods. However, the
two anomaly detection methods differ in their approach to solve the supervised anomaly
detection problem. The first method, K-Means+ID3, is designed to identify data instances
as either "normal" or "anomaly". That means, from a classification point-of-view, the K-
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Means+ID3 method performs a two-category classification. Applications of such "twocategory" anomaly detection approaches exist in domains where data instances may be
known to originate due to an anomaly but the class or type of anomaly itself is unknown.
For example, in the case of detecting an evolving crack in a mechanical system under
fatigue stress, it may be known that the data instances generated during the evolution of
the crack corresponds to an anomaly; however, to what specific anomaly type the data
instance belongs is unknown. The second method, dependence tree based anomaly
detection, is designed to identify specific types of anomalies. That is, the dependence tree
based anomaly detection method performs multi-category classification. Applications of
such "multi-category" approaches to anomaly detection exist in domains where data
instances are known to belong to normal or to specific types of anomalies. An example of
such an application domain is the detection of computer network attacks, where the type
of anomaly is known to belong to one of the several attack types like denial-of-service
attack, probing attack, user-to-root access attack, etc. Next, we present a brief overview
of the K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection method and the dependence tree based anomaly
detection method.

1.1

K-Means+ID3 Anomaly Detection Method

The K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection method cascades two data mining
algorithms: (1) k-Means clustering [13] and (2) the ID3 decision tree learning [14] for
classifying normal and anomaly data instances. In the first stage of K-Means+ID3, kMeans clustering is performed on training instances to obtain k disjoint clusters using
Euclidean distance similarity. The k-Means algorithm is used to organize the training
instances into disjoint subsets or "clusters," where each member in a cluster is more
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closely related to other members in its associated cluster than to members in other
clusters. In the second stage of K-Means+ID3, each cluster of training instances is further
subject to ID3 decision tree learning. In ID3 learning, the ID3 algorithm builds a decision
tree from the cluster of training instances. The leaf nodes of the ID3 decision tree contain
the class name whereas a non-leaf node is a decision node. Each leaf node contains one
of the two classes: (1) normal or (2) anomaly.
Once the training set is organized into clusters and associated ID3 decision trees,
test data is compared to the classification system established by the training data set.
Using this classification system, an unknown test instance is (1) examined for closeness
to the clusters, and (2) for the closest clusters (i.e., the clusters that are closest by
Euclidean distance between the test data instance and the clusters' centroids), the
decision on the test instance as normal or anomaly is given by each cluster's ID3 decision
tree. The ID3 decision tree's decision is contrasted with the k-Means cluster's decision,
and the first conformity between the two decisions is the decision assigned to the
unknown data instance.
Experiments were performed on three datasets: (1) Network Anomaly Data
(NAD), (2) Duffing Equation Data (DED), and (3) Mechanical System Data (MSD),
which contain measurements from three distinct application domains of computer
networks, an electronic circuit implementing a forced Duffing equation, and a mechanical
mass-beam system respectively. Anomaly detection performance of the K-Means+ID3
method was gauged using six performance measures: (1) detection accuracy, (2) false
positive rate, (3) area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, (4)
precision, (5) total accuracy (or recall), and (6) F-measure. Results show that the
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detection accuracy of the K-Means+ID3 method is as high as 96.24% at a false positive
rate of 3.66% on NAD; the total accuracy is as high as 80.01% on MSD and 79.9% on
DED.

1.2

Dependence Tree Based Anomaly Detection Method

Dependence trees approximate an w-dimensional joint probability distribution as a
product of second-order component distributions, that is, probability distributions
conditioned on at most one variable. The component probability distributions are selected
such that they maximize the mutual information [15] between features. For the purpose of
anomaly detection, we use dependence trees to approximate the class conditional
probability density "P(X | co)", which is the probability that an unknown data instance
X occurs given that it belongs to a class variable co. The class variable co is one of
normal, a denial-of-service attack, a probing attack, a user-to-root attack, or a remote-tologin attack. Once the class conditional probability densities are obtained, through Bayes
formula [13], the class conditional probability density is transformed to posterior
probability P(co | x),

which is the probability of occurrence of a class co given an

unknown data instance X. The data instance X is then assigned to a class with the
highest posterior probability.
Because dependence tree construction is an optimization procedure that
maximizes mutual information between features, the features with high correlation tend
to have high mutual information (see [16]). However, when features are highly
correlated, the respective class-discriminative power changes little if some of the features
are removed. Therefore, to reduce correlation within the features in dependence trees, we
perform feature selection using the supervised and unsupervised versions of the
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Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection method. Further,
we theoretically show that the MRMR feature selection criterion minimizes an upper
bound on the Bayes error rate.
To demonstrate the performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection
method, experiments were performed on KDD Cup 1999 benchmark intrusion detection
datasets [41]. The KDD Cup 1999 datasets contain labeled instances of normal and attack
traffic originating from the MIT-DARPA simulated computer network testbed [17].
Results show that the dependence tree based anomaly detection has category-wise
detection accuracy as high as 99.76% for normal, 93.88% for denial-of-service attacks,
94.88% for probe attacks, 86.40% for user-to-root attacks, and 24.44% for remote-tologin attacks. The dependence tree based anomaly detection method is further compared
with two classifier based anomaly detection methods: (1) the naive Bayes [13] anomaly
detection and (2) the ID3 decision tree based anomaly detection as well as with intrusion
detection models reported in Bouzida et al. [18] and Song et al. [19].

1.3

Contributions of the Dissertation

The contributions of the dissertation are enumerated as follows:
•

The dissertation presents "K-Means+ID3," a novel method to cascade the kMeans clustering and ID3 decision tree learning methods for mitigating the
Forced Assignment and Class Dominance problems of the k-Means method for
classifying data originating from normal and anomalous behaviors in a computer
network, an active electronic circuit, and a mechanical mass beam system under
fatigue stress.
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•

The dissertation evaluates the performance of K-Means+ID3 classifier and
compares it with the individual k-Means clustering and ID3 decision tree methods
using six performance measures.

•

From a classification perspective, the dissertation presents a novel method for
cascading two successful data partition methods for improving classification
performance. From an anomaly detection perspective, the dissertation presents a
high performance anomaly detection method.

•

The dissertation presents a dependence tree based anomaly detection method for
detecting attacks on a computer network. Further, the Maximal Relevance
Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection method is used to obtain an
optimal set of features for attack detection using dependence trees.

•

The dissertation presents a theoretical relationship between dependence tree
classification error and Bayes error rate and shows that the dependence tree
approximation procedure minimizes an upper bound on Bayes error rate.

•

The dissertation presents a theoretical relationship between MRMR feature
selection and Bayes error rate and shows that the MRMR feature selection
criterion minimizes an upper bound on the Bayes error rate.

•

The dissertation evaluates the performance of the dependence tree based anomaly
detection method in detecting attacks on a computer network, and compares it
with two popular classification methods, namely, the naive Bayes method and the
ID3 decision tree method.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related

research in anomaly detection. Chapter 3 introduces the K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection
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method and discusses anomaly detection with individual k-Means and ID3 methods.
Chapter 4 details the training and testing phases of the K-Means+ID3 method. Chapter 5
discusses the datasets used to evaluate the K-Means+ID3 method. Chapter 6 presents the
results of the K-Means+ID3 method. Chapter 7 presents the dependence tree based
anomaly detection method. Chapter 8 presents theoretical relationship between the
dependence tree classification error and Bayes error rate. Chapter 9 introduces the
MRMR feature selection method and presents the relationship between MRJV1R feature
selection criterion and the Bayes error rate. Chapter 10 discusses the KDD Cup 1999
dataset used for evaluating the performance of the dependence tree based anomaly
detection method. Chapter 11 presents the results of the MRMR feature selection method
and the dependence tree based anomaly detection method. We conclude the dissertation
and identify future research directions in Chapter 12.

CHAPTER 2
RELATED RESEARCH
In this chapter, we present recent research work related to anomaly detection. This
chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents related research on
anomaly detection in computer networks. The second section presents related research on
anomaly detection in other domains (e.g., mechanical fatigue-crack detection, anomaly
detection in computer hosts, anomaly detection in electronic circuits, etc).

2.1

Anomaly Detection Research in Computer Networks

Sarasamma et al. in [9] presented a multilevel hierarchical Kohonen network to
implement a network anomaly detection system. Their motivation for implementing a
multilevel Kohonen network was that the single-layered Kohonen network, though
effective in grouping similar input vectors into clusters, does not guarantee an optimal
separation of resulting clusters. Further, the experiments with single-layered Kohonen
network on KDD Cup 1999 network intrusion detection data have resulted in
unacceptably high false positive rates. On the other hand, an anomaly detection system
based on a multilevel hierarchical Kohonen network combined with domain knowledge
based grouping of features in KDD Cup 1999 dataset has resulted in detection accuracy
as high as 97.19% for denial-of-service attacks, 87.88% for probe attacks, 66.52% for
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user-to-root attacks, and 0.37% for remote-to-login attacks. These detection accuracies

were achieved at a false positive rate of 2.92%, which was the lowest false positive rate
achieved by the hierarchical Kohonen network.
Sarasamma et al. in [20] presented a hyperellipsoidal clustering technique for
supervised anomaly. The hyperellipsoidal clustering technique is implemented as a selforganizing map in which the winning cluster is decided based on the Mahalanobis
distance between the input vector and the cluster mean. A new cluster is initiated if the
Mahalanobis distance between the input vector and the winning cluster center is greater
than a predefined threshold. The motivation for using Mahalanobis distance as a transfer
function in the self-organizing map comes from the assumption that each cluster
originates from a multivariate Gaussian distribution function. The locus of points of
constant density for a multivariate Gaussian distribution function geometrically forms a
hyper ellipsoid with constant radius given by Mahalanobis distance. By applying
hyperellipsoidal clustering on KDD Cup 1999 network traffic datasets, Sarasamma et al.
[20] achieved a detection accuracy of 83.97% for denial-of-service attacks, 91.31%o for
probe attacks, 84.56%> for user-to-root attacks, and 33.78%) for remote-to-login attacks at
a false positive rate of 2.68%.
Song et al. in [19] presented a genetic programming approach to supervised
anomaly detection. The Random Subset Selection-Dynamic Subset Selection (RSS-DSS)
algorithm was proposed for dynamically filtering large datasets for subsequent
classification in genetic programming paradigm. The RSS-DSS algorithm initially
divides the entire training set into small blocks to allow incremental loading on to the
main memory. Next, a block is selected with uniform probability and a subset of training
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patterns are selected from the block based on two parameters: (1) age and (2) difficulty.

Training is performed on the selected subset of patterns through an evolutionary phase
which involves "crossover" and "mutation" operations of genetic programming. Three
different fitness functions: (1) equal class cost, (2) variable class cost, and (3) hierarchical
cost are used to determine the best evolutionary phases. In [19], experiments were
conducted on KDD Cup 1999 datasets and only the first eight "basic" features were
utilized. The RSS-DSS genetic programming approach achieved a detection accuracy of
95.6% for denial-of-service attacks, 48.5% for probe attacks, 10.1% for user-to-root
attacks, and 0.2% for root-to-login attacks. These attack detection accuracies were
reported at a false positive rate of 0.27%.
Qu et al. in [21] introduced a new correlation measure to select features for
classification and data mining tasks. Their correlation measure, measured between any
two features, is known as Decision Dependent Correlation (DDC). The DDC measures
correlation in terms of two components: (1) the correlation between features and the class
variable, calculated as sum of mutual information between two features and the class
variable, and (2) the correlation between features, calculated as the mutual information
between the two features. The first component quantifies the relevance of features with
the class variable and the second component quantifies the redundancy within features.
Feature selection is performed by maximizing the first component and minimizing the
second component of the DDC measure. Qu et al. [21] performed experiments on the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. By incrementally using DDC measure to select a set of features
and by using a linear discriminant function to perform classification, Qu et al. achieved
99.93% detection accuracy with 0.07% false positive rate for denial-of-service attacks,
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99.91% detection accuracy with 0.09% false positive rate for probe attacks, 91.13%

detection accuracy with 9.258% false positive rate for user-to-root attacks, and 92.47%
detection accuracy with 8.35% false positive rate for remote-to-login attacks. It is to be
noted here that Qu et al. performed two-category attack detection (i.e., identifying a
single attack type in the presence of normal traffic) as opposed to multi-category attack
detection, as performed by earlier mentioned works of Sarasamma et al. [9][20], Song et
al. [19], and the dependence tree based anomaly detection method of this dissertation.
Bouzida et al. in [18] performed anomaly detection in network traffic using
nearest neighbor classification and C4.5 decision trees. The use of nearest neighbor
classification for anomaly detection was motivated by the fact that its classification error
is bounded by twice the Bayes error rate, the least possible classification error that can be
achieved by any classification method (see [22]). The use of C4.5 decision trees for
anomaly detection in network traffic was motivated by the robustness of C4.5 decision
trees in handling noisy data and by their high classification performance in various
application domains such as automated patient classification, image classification, etc.
(see [23]). Further, to reduce the dimensionality of data, Bouzida et al. performed feature
extraction using principal component analysis. Experiments performed on the KDD Cup
1999 datasets using the nearest neighbor classification rule and four principal
components resulted in 97.14% detection accuracy for denial-of-service attacks, 74.4%
detection accuracy for probe attacks, 7.91% detection accuracy for user-to-root attacks,
and 0.80% for root-to-login attacks, at a false positive rate of 0.5%. Experiments with
C4.5 decision trees and four principal components resulted in 97.25% detection accuracy
for denial-of-service attacks, 66.80% detection accuracy for probe attacks, 6.58%
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detection accuracy for user-to-root attacks, and 0. 01% detection accuracy for remote-tologin attacks, with 1.0% false positive rate.

2.2

Anomaly Detection Research in Other Domains

Khatkhate et al. in [1] presented the symbolic time series analysis method for
detecting anomalies resulting from fatigue cracks in ductile alloys. The first step in
symbolic time series analysis involved partitioning the time series for constructing
symbol sequences. For this purpose, Khatkhate et al. [1] used wavelet space partitioning,
in which the time series data was converted into wavelet space at different scales and
time shifts. Next, graphs of wavelet coefficients verses the scales were stacked starting
with the smallest value of the scale and ending with the largest value. This wavelet space
was then partitioned using the maximum entropy partitioning. A Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) was used to probabilistically score a given set of symbols as normal or anomaly.
The scores from the HMM were compared with the scores from three machine learning
methods, namely the Principle Component Analysis (PCA), Multi-Layer Perceptron
Neural Network (MLPNN), and Radial Basis Function Neural Network (RBFNN).
Khatkhate et al. empirically demonstrated that the symbolic time series method for
anomaly detection outperforms PCA, MLPNN, and RBFNN in identifying early fatigue
crack anomalies, while all the four methods performed well in detecting evolved
anomalies.
Chin et al. in [7] applied the concept of symbolic time series based anomaly
detection to detect anomalies in a non-linear electronic system. The symbolic time series
method was tested on an electronic system implementing a second-order, nonautonomous forced Duffing equation. The dissipation parameter ' P ' , implemented as
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resistance in the electronic circuit was varied between 0.10 - 0.35 to generate system
response. The system response at $ = 0.10 was recorded as normal and the response at
P > 0.10 was recorded as anomaly. Three machine learning methods-namely PC A,
MLPNN, and RBFNN-were used to compare the anomaly detection performance of the
symbolic time series method. Results of the experiments in [7] showed that the symbolic
time series analysis method outperformed the PCA, MLPNN, and RBFNN methods in
detecting slowly evolving anomalies, i.e., the system response when p is between 0.15
and 0.27.
Ye et al. [24] present multivariate statistical analysis of audit trails for host-based
intrusion detection. Hotelling's T2 test and the chi-squared (%2) test, which are
multivariate statistical process control techniques, were used to analyze audit trails. The
Hotelling's T2 statistic and the %2 statistic were used to calculate the amount of deviation
between a given test sample and the normal (in-control) population. Experiments were
performed on two datasets: (1) a four hour Basic Security Model (BSM) audit trail data
consisting of 1,406 audit trails of normal events and 1,225 events of intrusive activities
and 2) a large BSM audit trail containing 3,174,584 normal events and 48,000 audit trails
of intrusive events. Accuracy results and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves
on these datasets showed that the chi-squared test results were either better than or
comparable to the Hotelling's test for both the datasets. The reason for the relatively
better performance of the chi-squared test, as hypothesized by Nong Ye et al., was that
the intrusive activities manifest themselves mainly through mean shifts, which the chisquared test has captured very effectively.

15
Chang et al. in [25] performed anomaly detection and classification in
hyperspectral imagery using two methods: (1) Reed and Yu (RXD) method based on
Mahalanobis distance and (2) Low Probability Detection (LPD) method. In hyperspectral
image analysis, anomaly detection refers to the identification of targets whose signatures
are distinct from their surroundings. Chang et al. demonstrated that the RXD method
coupled with linearly-constrained minimum variance classification method outperformed
the LPD anomaly detection method in detecting anomalies in hyperspectral images of
forest landscapes. Additionally, methods for anomaly detection appear in [42], [43], [44],
[45], [46], [47], [48], and [49].

CHAPTER 3
THE K-MEANS+ID3 ANOMALY
DETECTION METHOD
In this chapter, we introduce the K-Means+ID3 method for anomaly detection and
briefly discuss anomaly detection with individual k-Means and ID3 learning algorithms.
K-Means+ID3 is a novel supervised anomaly detection method developed by cascading
two machine learning algorithms: (1) the k-Means clustering and (2) the ID3 decision
tree learning. In the first stage, k-Means clustering is performed on training instances to
obtain k disjoint clusters. Each k-Means cluster represents a region of similar instances,
"similar" in terms of Euclidean distances between the instances and their cluster
centroids. We choose k-Means clustering because (1) it is a data-driven method with
relatively few assumptions on the distributions of the underlying data and (2) the greedy
search strategy of k-Means guarantees at least a local minimum of the criterion function,
thereby accelerating the convergence of clusters on large datasets. In the second stage of
K-Means+ID3, the k-Means method is cascaded with the ID3 decision tree learning by
building an ID3 decision tree using the instances in each k-Means cluster. Cascading the
k-Means clustering method with ID3 decision tree learning alleviates two problems in kMeans clustering: (1) the Forced Assignment problem, and (2) the Class Dominance
problem. The Forced Assignment problem arises when parameter k in k-Means is set to a
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value considerably less than the inherent number of natural groupings within the training
data. The k-Means procedure initialized with a low k value under estimates the natural
groups within the training data and therefore will not capture the overlapping groups
within a cluster, forcing the instances from different groups to be a part of the same
cluster. Such 'forced assignments' in anomaly detection may increase the false positive
rate or decrease the detection accuracy. As an example of forced assignment in an
anomaly detection setting, consider an anomaly in network traffic originating from a
particular type of attack (say a 'remote-to-user' attack) whose network traffic may be
very similar to that of normal traffic. In this case, a low value of A: may force the k-Means
to assign attack instances to a normal cluster because the value of k is insufficient to
capture the inherent sub-group structure of the attack that differentiates it from the
normal traffic; more specifically, the distance (similarity) between the attack instance and
the cluster representing a normal class is less than the distance between the attack
instance and the cluster representing an anomaly class. The second problem which KMeans+ID3 alleviates, Class Dominance, arises in a cluster when the training data have a
large number of instances from one particular class and very few instances from the
remaining classes. Such clusters, dominated by a single class, show weak association to
the remaining classes. That is, when classifying an anomaly associated with a cluster
dominated by normal instances or vice-versa, decisions based exclusively on the
probabilistic likelihood of the instance being associated with the cluster will most likely
misclassify the instance. The Forced Assignment and Class Dominance problems cause
instances from different classes, like the normal and anomaly classes in our case, to
overlap within the same cluster. However, a decision tree trained on each cluster learns
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the sub-grouping (if any) present within each cluster and refines the decision boundaries

within the clusters dominated by a single class by partitioning the instances with a set of
if-then constraints over the feature space. Cascading the decisions from the k-Means and
ID3 methods involves two phases: (1) the Candidate Selection phase, and (2) the
Candidate Combination phase. In the Candidate Selection phase, / clusters nearest in
Euclidean distance between the cluster centroids and the test instance are selected. In the
Candidate Combination phase, two rules are used-(l) the nearest consensus rule and (2)
the nearest neighbor rule-to combine the decisions of the k-Means and the ID3
algorithms to obtain a final classification decision over a test instance.
We perform experiments on three datasets: (1) the network anomaly data, which
is feature extracted from the 1998, 1999, and 2000 MIT-DARPA network traffic
[17] [26] [27] using an artificial neural network based non-linear component analysis
method presented in [28]; (2) the Duffing equation data [7], containing measurements
from an active electronic circuit implementing a forced Duffing equation; and (3) the
mechanical systems data [1], containing measurements drawn from a mechanical
apparatus that excites a mass-beam structure for generating small fatigue cracks. The
three datasets contain representative anomalous and normal behavioral patterns from
three distinct domains of computer networks, an active electronic circuit system, and a
mechanical system. Performance evaluation of the K-Means+ID3 cascading approach is
conducted using six measures: (1) detection accuracy or True Positive Rate (TPR), (2)
False Positive Rate (FPR), (3) precision, (4) total accuracy (or accuracy), (5) F-measure,
and (6) Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves and Areas Under ROC Curves
(AUCs). The performance

of K-Means+ID3 is empirically compared with the
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performance of individual k-Means clustering and the ID3 decision tree classification
algorithms. Next, we briefly discuss the individual k-Means clustering and the ID3
decision tree learning methods for anomaly detection.

3.1

Anomaly Detection with Individual
K-Means Clustering Method

The k-Means algorithm groups N data points into k disjoint clusters where k is a
predefined parameter. The steps in the k-Means clustering based anomaly detection
method are as follows.
1.

Select k random instances from the training data subset as the centroids of the
clusters C,,C 2 ,...Q .

2. For each training instance X.
a. Compute the Euclidean distanceZ)(C ( ,X),

i - l...k. Find cluster Cq that is

closest to X.
b. Assign X to C . Update the centroid of Cq. (The centroid of a cluster is the
arithmetic mean of the instances in the cluster.)
3. Repeat step (2) until the centroids of clusters Cl,C2,...Ck

stabilize in terms of mean-

squared-error criterion.
4. For each test instance Z:
a. Compute the Euclidean distance£>(C;,Z),
closest to Z.

i = \...k. Find cluster Cr that is
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b. Classify Z as an anomaly or a normal instance using either the Threshold rule
or the Bayes Decision rule. The Threshold rule for classifying a test instance Z
that belongs to cluster Cr is
Assign Z —> 1 ;/ P(colr \Z <=Cr)>r; Otherwise Z -» 0,
where '0' and ' 1 ' represent normal and anomaly classes, coXr represents the
anomaly class in cluster Cn P{colr \Z eCr)

represents the probability of

anomaly instances in Cr, and r is a predefined threshold. In our experiments,
the threshold is set to 0.5 so that a test instance is classified as an anomaly
only if it belongs to a cluster that has anomaly instances in majority. The
Bayes Decision rule is
Assign Z -> 1 if P(a>lr | Z e Cr) > P(a>0r | Z e Cr}, Otherwise

Z -> 0,

where co0r represents the normal class in cluster Cr, P(co0r \Z e C r ) is the
probability of normal instances in cluster Cr.

3.2

Anomaly Detection with ID3 Decision Tree Learning

The ID3 decision tree learning algorithm computes the Information Gain G on
each attribute A, defined as

\s I
G(S,A) = Entropy(S)-

^
veValues(A)

\-^Entropy(S

v),

\^\

where S is the total input space, ,SV is the subset of S for which attribute A has a value v.
c

The Entropy\S)

over c classes is given by ^ - / ? , log 2 (/?,), where /?, represents the

probability of class '/'. The attribute with the highest information gain, say B, is chosen
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as the root node of the tree. Next, a new decision tree is recursively constructed over each
value of B using the training subspaceS- {SB}. A leaf-node or a decision-node is formed
when all the instances within the available training subspace are from the same class. For
detecting anomalies, the ID3 decision tree outputs binary classification decision of '0' to
indicate normal and ' 1 ' to indicate anomaly class assignments to test instances.

CHAPTER 4
TRAINING AND TESTING THE
K-MEANS+ID3 ANOMALY
DETECTION METHOD
We are provided with a training dataset (X ; .,l^), i = 1,2,..., N where Xj
represents an w-dimensional continuous valued vector and Yt = {O, l} represents the
corresponding class label with '0' for normal and ' 1 ' for anomaly. The K-Means+ID3
method has two steps: (1) training and (2) testing. During training, steps 1-3 of the kMeans based anomaly detection method are first applied to partition the training space
into k disjoint clusters C1,C2,...Ck.

Then, an ID3 decision tree is trained with the

instances in each k-Means cluster. The k-Means method ensures that each training
instance is associated with only one cluster. However, if there are any sub-groups or
overlaps within a cluster, the ID3 decision tree trained on that cluster refines the decision
boundaries by partitioning the instances with a set of if-then rules over the feature space.
The testing step of the K-Means+ID3 has two phases: (1) the Candidate Selection phase
and (2) the Candidate Combination phase. In Candidate Selection, decisions from kMeans and ID3 based anomaly detection methods are extracted. In Candidate
Combination, the decisions of the k-Means and ID3 decision tree methods are combined
to give a final decision on the class membership of a test instance. For combining the k-
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Means and ID3 decision tree methods, we present two combination rules: (1) the nearest
neighbor rule, and (2) the nearest consensus rule. A detailed explanation of the two
phases follows.

4.1
Figure
DTx,DT1,...DTk

4.1

presents

The Candidate Selection Phase
the

procedure

for

the

Candidate

Let

be the ID3 decision trees on clusters C,,C 2 ,...Q formed by applying

the k-Means method on the training instances. Let rx,r2,...rk
Cl,C2,...Ck

Selection.

be the centroids of

respectively. Given a test instance Z., the Candidate Selection procedure

extracts anomaly scores from/candidate clusters Gl,G2,...Gk.

The '/candidate clusters'

are / clusters in C,, C 2 ,... Ck that are nearest to Z, in terms of the Euclidean distance
between Z ; and the cluster centroids. Here,/is a user-defined parameter.

iripili* l e s t i n s t a n c e s £•» / — 7». «o ( f vaJLue.
Output:. Anomaly score matrix for Z-„ i - 1. . .n.
Procedure CandldataijSeiection {
Step 1: For each test instance Z.a. Compute Euclidean distance D(l-F y , y « 1. . . *,
and find/clusters closest to Zj.
D. Compute kHbteans and 103 decision tree scores
for fnearest {candidate) clusters.
Step 2; ReturnftnomlayScore Matrix for Zj.
} /* End Procedure */
Figure 4.1 Procedure of Candidate Selection.
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the extraction of anomaly scores from k-Means clustering
and ID3 decision tree learning methods for / candidate clusters. Let
represent the centroids of candidate clusters

GnG2,...,Gf.

ml,m2,...,mf

LetDyZ^mJ-

dx,

D(Zj,m2) = d2, and D[Zj,mf) = df, represent the Euclidean distances between the test
vector Z( and the/candidate clusters. The k-Means anomaly scores Ps, s = 1,...,/, for
each of the/ candidate clusters is given by

P,=PM*

1—

d.

Equation 4.1

'=1

where P((ols) is the probability of anomaly instances in cluster ' s '. In Equation 4.1, the
term' 1 •

d.
S

9

is called the Scaling Factor (SF).

Zj Test Instance

k

^r^) f k-Means Clusters
ID3 Decision Trees

P,* = f K ) x1 - Zfl(Z,v,)
Anomaly
Score Matrix

Figure 4.2 Extraction of k-Means and ID3 decision tree scores from/= 3 candidate
clusters for the test instance Zu
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The SF scales P(cou ) by weighing it against the ratio of the Euclidean distance
between the cluster 5 and Z,; and the sum of Euclidean distances between Z, and the
clusters Ci,C2,...Ck.

The SF penalizes the probability of anomaly P{cou) in cluster s

with its distance from the test vector Z, i.e., a high value of ds yields a low/^ value and
vice versa. The decisions from the ID3 decision trees associated with the / candidate
clusters are either ' 0 ' representing normal or ' 1 ' representing an anomaly classes. The
Candidate Selection phase outputs an anomaly score matrix with the decisions extracted
from the k-Means and ID3 anomaly detection methods for a given test vector. The
decisions stored in the anomaly score matrix are combined in the Candidate Combination
phase to yield a final decision on the test vector. A detailed description of the Candidate
Combination follows.

4.2

The Candidate Combination Phase

The input to the Candidate Combination phase is the anomaly score matrix
containing the anomaly scores Ps, s = l,...,f, of the k-Means and the decisions of the
ID3 based anomaly detection methods over / candidate clusters. To combine the
decisions of the k-Means and ID3 algorithms, we first harden the anomaly scores of the
k-Means method by using the Threshold Rule presented in Section 2.1. Next, we use two
rules: (1) the nearest consensus rule and (2) the nearest neighbor rule to combine the
decisions.
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4.2.1

The Nearest Consensus Rule
Figure 4.3 shows an example of an anomaly score matrix for the test vector Z.

The/candidate clusters G,,G2,...,Gf
the distances d1,d2,...,df

are ordered in the anomaly score matrix such that

between Z and the candidate clusters

G,,G?,...,Gf

respectively, satisfy d, < d2 < ... < df. In the nearest consensus rule, the decision of the
nearest candidate cluster in which consensus exists between the decisions of the k-Means
and the ID3 decision tree methods is selected as the combined classification decision. For
example, in the anomaly score matrix shown in Figure 4.3, the nearest consensus occurs
in candidate cluster G2 and therefore the test vector is classified as ' 1' i.e., an anomaly.

Gj

GQ

G%

Gf

k-Means

1

1

0

*>*<•« *>«*•>*>* **#»

1

ID3

0

1

0

"«...-..

0

-

f
Consensus
Figure 4.3 An example anomaly score matrix for test instance Z. The anomaly
scores of the k-Means method are hardened using the Threshold rule.
4.2.2

The Nearest Neighbor Rule
The nearest neighbor rule chooses the decision of the ID3 decision tree associated

with the nearest candidate cluster within the / candidate clusters. In the anomaly score
matrix shown in Figure 4.3, G, is the nearest candidate cluster to the test vector Z.
Therefore, the nearest neighbor rule classifies the test vector as '0' (normal), which is the
decision of the ID3 decision tree associated with candidate cluster G,.

CHAPTER 5
DATASETS FOR TESTING THE
K-MEANS+ID3 METHOD
In this chapter we discuss three experimental datasets: (1) Network Anomaly Data
(NAD), (2) Duffing Equation Data (DED), and (3) Mechanical Systems Data (MSD).
The NAD contains three data subsets: (i) NAD-98, (ii) NAD-99, and (iii) NAD-00,
obtained by feature-extracting the 1998, 1999, and 2000 MIT-DARPA network traffic
corpora. The DED dataset was obtained from an active non-linear electronic circuit
implementing a second-order forced Duffing equation. The MSD dataset was obtained
from an apparatus designed to induce small fatigue cracks in ductile alloy (mass beam)
structures.
Table 5.1 summarizes the proportion of normal and anomaly instances, and the
number of dimensions in the three datasets. The training and testing data subsets were
randomly drawn from the original NAD, DED, and MSD datasets. The number of
instances in all the training data subsets was restricted to utmost 5000 instances, with
70% of them being normal and the rest being anomaly instances. The testing datasets
contain utmost 2500 unseen instances (i.e., those excluded in training data subsets), with
80% of them being normal and the remaining 20% being anomaly instances. The ratio of
training datasets to the testing datasets is 65% to 35% except for the NAD-2000 and DED
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datasets. The NAD-2000 and DED datasets contain comparatively less number of
training and testing instances because of the limited number of normal instances available
in DED and the limited number of anomaly instances available in NAD-2000. Therefore,
the training-to-testing dataset ratio for DED is 60% to 40% and for the NAD-2000 is 50%
to 50%. A brief description of each dataset follows.

Table 5.1 Characteristics of the NAD, DED and MSD datasets used in the anomaly
detection experiments.

Datasets

NAD

Dimensions

Training Instances

Testing Instances

Normal

Anomaly

Normal

Anomaly

1998

12

3500

1500

2000

500

1999

10

3500

1500

2000

500

2000

10

294

126

336

84

DED

4

1288

502

860

215

MSD

4

3500

1500

2000

500

5.1

Network Anomaly Data

The NAD-98, NAD-99, and NAD-00 data subsets contain artificial neural
network based Non-Linear Component Analysis (NLCA) feature-extracted 1998, 1999,
and 2000 MIT-DARPA network traffic [28], respectively. The 1998 MIT-DARPA
datasets [17] were collected on an evaluation test bed simulating network traffic similar
to that seen between an Air Force base (INSIDE network) and the Internet (OUTSIDE
network). Thirty-eight different attacks (documented in [17]) were launched from the
OUTSIDE network. Approximately seven weeks of training data and two weeks of test
data were collected by a sniffer deployed between the INSIDE and OUTSIDE network.
List files provide attack labels for the seven-week training data. However, the list files
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associated with the test data do not contain attack labels. For this reason, we use only the
seven-week training data for both training and testing purposes. The 1999 MIT-DARPA
datasets [26] were generated on a test bed similar to that used for 1998 MIT-DARPA
datasets. Twenty-nine additional attacks (documented in [26]) were developed. The
datasets contain approximately three weeks of training data (with two weeks of data
exclusively containing normal traffic) and two weeks of test data. In our experiments we
use the tcpdumps collected by the sniffer in the INSIDE network on weeks 1, 3, 4 and 5.
The tcpdumps from Week-2 were excluded because the list files associated with datasets
were not available. The 2000 MIT-DARPA datasets [27] are attack-scenario specific
datasets. The datasets contain three attack scenarios simulated with the background traffic
being similar to those in 1999 MIT-DARPA datasets. The first dataset, LLS DDOS 1.0,
simulates a 3.5 hour attack scenario in which a novice attacker launches a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against a naive adversary. The second dataset, LLS
DDOS 2.0.2, is a two-hour stealthy DDoS attack scenario. The third dataset, Windows
NT Attack, is a nine-hour dataset containing five phased Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
on Windows NT hosts.

5.2

Duffing Equation Data

This section describes the preparation of the Duffing Equation Dataset (DED).
Chin et al. [7] use an active non-linear electronic circuit to generate the data. The circuit
implements a second-order, non-autonomous, forced Duffing equation represented as
*l*fL
dt2

+ p(ts)^±
'' dt

+ x(t) + x3(t) = Acoscot
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The dissipation parameter j3(ts), implemented as resistance in the circuit, varies in

the slow-time ts and is constant in the fast time-scale t at which the dynamical system is
excited. Although the system dynamics is represented by a low order differential
equation, it exhibits chaotic behavior that is sufficiently complex from thermodynamic
perspectives and is adequate for illustration of the anomaly detection concept. The goal is
to detect, the changes in /3(ts), which are associated with an anomaly. Setting the
stimulus with amplitude A = 5.5 and&>= 5.0 rad/sec, the stationary behavior of the
system response for this input stimulus is obtained for several values of (3 in the range of
0.10 to 0.35. In all our experiments with DED, we have considered the datasets with/? =
0.1, p = 0.32, p = 0.33, p = 0.34, and p = 0.35 to randomly select 1790 instances for
preparing the training data subsets and 1075 unseen random instances for preparing the
test data subset.

5.3

Mechanical Systems Data

This section discusses the preparation of Mechanical System Data (MSD).
Khatkhate et al. [1] present the test apparatus to generate the MSD. The test apparatus has
two subsystems: (1) the plant subsystem consisting of the mechanical structure including
test specimens (i.e., the mass-beams that undergo fatigue crack damage), electromagnetic shakers, and displacement measuring sensors; and (2) the instrumentation and
control subsystem consisting of the hardware and software components related to data
acquisition and processing. The mechanical structure of the test apparatus is persistently
excited near resonance to induce a stress level that causes fatigue cracks in the mass
beam specimens and yields an average life of approximately 20,000 cycles or 36 minutes.
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The mass beams attain stationary behavior in the fast-time scale of machine vibrations
when persistently excited in the vicinity of its resonant frequency. Fatigue cracks occur at
a slow time scale that is slow relative to the fast time scale dynamics of the vibratory
motion. The goal here is to detect the slowly evolving anomaly, possibly due to fatigue
cracks, by observing the time series data from displacement measuring sensors. There is a
total of 36 minutes of data. The first two minutes of data are considered transient
(normal) and the rest from 3 to 36 minutes of data are considered as steady state
asymptotic behavior (anomaly). In all our experiments with MSD, we used the data
recorded during the 1st, 33 rd , 34th, 35 th , and the 36th minute to randomly select 5000
instances for preparing the training data subsets and 2500 unseen random instances for
preparing the test data subset.

CHAPTER 6
RESULTS OF K-MEANS+ID3 ANOMALY
DETECTION METHOD
In this chapter we present the results of the K-Means+ID3 method with the
nearest neighbor and nearest consensus combination rules and compare it with the
individual k-Means and ID3 decision tree methods over the NAD, DED, and MSD
datasets. We use six measures for comparing the performance^ 1) TPR or recall is the
percentage of anomaly instances correctly detected, (2) FPR is the percentage of normal
instances incorrectly classified as anomaly, (3) 'precision' is the percentage of correctly
detected anomaly instances over all the detected anomaly instances, (4) 'total accuracy'
or 'accuracy' is the percentage of all normal and anomaly instances that are correctly
classified, (5) the 'F-measure' is the equally-weighted (harmonic) mean of precision and
recall, and (6) the ROCs [29] and AUCs [30] give the performance of an anomaly
detection system with FPR on the x-axis and TPR on the y-axis. The performance
measures: precision, recall, and F-measure determine how the K-Means+ID3, the kMeans, and the ID3 methods perform in identifying anomaly instances. The performance
measure 'accuracy' determines the number of normal and anomaly instances correctly
classified by the anomaly detection methods. The measures FPR and AUC determine the
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number of false positives that the anomaly detection systems generate at specific
detection accuracies. The results of our experiments on the NAD, DED, and MSD follow.

6.1

Results on the NAD-1998 Dataset

Here we present the results of the k-Means and ID3 decision tree based anomaly
detection methods and the K-Means+ID3 method over the NAD-1998 datasets. Figure
6.1 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the K-Means+ID3 methods
averaged over 10 trials for k-means and K-means+ID3. For the NAD-1998 datasets, the k
value of the k-Means method was set to 20. For the ID3, the training space was
discretized into 45 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3 cascading method the k
was set to 20 and the data discretized into 45 equal-width intervals. The choice of k value
used in our experiments was based on 10 trial experiments conducted with A: set to 5, 10,
15, and 20. The performance of the k-Means based anomaly detection showed no
significant improvement when k value was set to a value greater than 20. Similarly, the
choice of the number of equal-width intervals for discretization was based on 19
experiments conducted with different discretization values (e.g. 10, 15,..., 100). Figure
6.1 shows that: (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading method based on Nearest Neighbor (NN)
combination rule has better performance than the k-means and ID3 in terms of TPR, FPR,
Precision, and Accuracy; (ii) the TPR, FPR, Precision, Accuracy, and F-measure of the
K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC combination is in-between the k-Means and the ID3;
and (iii) the K-Means+ID3 with NN combination outperforms the k-Means and ID3
algorithms in terms of F-measure, obtained from combining precision and recall.
Figure 6.2 shows the ROC curves and AUC values for the k-Means, ID3 and KMeans+ID3 methods. The ROC curves for the K-Means+ID3 and the k-Means
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algorithms were plotted for the trials with the AUC values closest to the mean TPR
values shown in Figure 6.1. The ROC for K-Means+ID3 cascading algorithm with NN
combination rule shows that the best TPR is achieved at 0.76 with an FPR as low as 0.05.
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Figure 6.1 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the KMeans+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the NAD-1998
test dataset.
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Figure 6.2 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3, and K-Means+ID3 with NNRule and NC-Rule over the NAD-1998 test dataset.
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6.2

Results on the NAD-1999 Dataset

Figure 6.3 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the KMeans+ID3 methods averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the
NAD-1999 datasets, the k value of individual k-Means was set to 5. For the ID3
algorithm, the training space was discretized into 25 equal-width intervals. For the KMeans+ID3 cascading, the value of k was set to 5 and the data was discretized into 25
equal-width intervals.
Figure 6.3 shows that (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC combination has
better performance than the k-Means and ID3 in terms of TPR, and (ii) precision,
accuracy, and F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 with NN combination is higher than the kMeans and ID3.
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Figure 6.3 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the KMeans+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the NAD-1999
test dataset.
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Figure 6.4 shows the ROC curves and AUC values of the k-Means, ID3 and KMeans+ID3 methods over NAD-1999. The ROC curves for K-Means+ID3 and k-Means
method were plotted for the trial with the AUC values closest to the mean TPR values
shown in Figure 6.3. The K-Means+ID3 cascading with NN and NC combination has the
same AUC performance as compared to k-Means and ID3 methods.
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Figure 6.4 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3, and K-Means+ID3 with NNRule and NC-Rule over the NAD-1999 test dataset.
6.3

Results on the NAD-2000 Dataset

Figure 6.5 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the KMeans+ID3 methods averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the
NAD-2000 datasets, the k value of the k-Means was set to 10. For the ID3 algorithm, the
training space was discretized into 15 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3
cascading algorithm, we set the value of k to 10 and discretized the data into 15 equalwidth intervals.
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Figure 6.5 shows that (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NN combination has
better performance than the k-Means and ID3 in terms of FPR and Precision, (ii) the TPR
of the K-Means+ID3 cascading is less than the k-Means and ID3 methods, and (iii) the
accuracy of the K-Means+ID3 is similar to the k-Means and ID3 methods.
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Figure 6.5 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the KMeans+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the NAD-2000
test dataset.
Figure 6.6 shows the ROC curves and AUC values of the k-Means, ID3 and KMeans+ID3 methods over NAD-2000 test dataset. The ROC curves for the KMeans+ID3 and k-Means methods were plotted for the trial with the AUC value closest
to the mean TPR values in Figure 6.5. The ROC curves for the k-Means, and ID3
methods show better performance than the K-Means+ID3 cascading algorithm over the
NAD-2000 datasets.
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Figure 6.6 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3, and K-Means+ID3
methods over the NAD-2000 test dataset.
6.4

Results on the Duffing Equation Dataset

Figure 6.7 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the KMeans+ID3 methods averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the
DED datasets, the k value for the k-Means was set to 5 clusters. For the ID3, the training
space was discretized into 45 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3 method, we
set the value of A: to 5 and discretized the data into 45 equal-width intervals.
Figure 6.7 shows that (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC and NN
combination has better performance than the k-Means in terms of FPR, precision, and
accuracy, (ii) the F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 cascading is in-between the k-Means
and the ID3, (iii) the TPR of the k-Means+ID3 is less than the k-Means and ID3 methods.
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Figure 6.7 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the KMeans+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the DED
test dataset.
Figure 6.8 shows the ROC curves and AUC values of the k-Means, ID3 and KMeans+ID3 methods over DED. The ROC curves for K-Means+ID3 and k-Means
algorithm were plotted for the trial with the AUC value that is closest to the mean TPR
values shown in Figure 6.7. The ROC curve for the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC
and NN combinations is in-between the k-Means and the ID3 methods over the DED test
datasets.
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Figure 6.8 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3 and K-Means+ID3
methods over the DED test dataset.
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6.5

Results on the Mechanical Systems Dataset

Figure 6.9 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the K-Means+ID3
algorithms averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the MSD
datasets, the k value of the k-Means was set to 5. For the ID3 method, the training space
was discretized into 65 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3 method, we set the
value of & to 5 and discretize the data into 65 equal-width intervals.
Figure 6.9 shows that: (i) K-Means+ID3 with NC combination has better
performance than the k-Means in terms of FPR, precision, and F-measure, and (ii) the
precision, accuracy, and the F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 with NC combination is
higher than the k-Means method.
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Figure 6.9 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the KMeans+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the MSD
test dataset.
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Figure 6.10 shows the ROC curves and AUCs of the k-Means, ID3 and KMeans+ID3 methods over MSD. The ROC curves for K-Means+ID3 and k-Means
methods were plotted for the trial with the AUC value that is closest to the mean TPR
values in Figure 6.9. The ROC curves for the K-Means+ID3 with NN combination shows
a TPR rate as high as 0.98 at a FPR of 0.4 over the MSD test dataset.
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Figure 6.10 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3 and K-Means+ID3
methods over the MSD test dataset.

CHAPTER 7

ANOMALY DETECTION USING
DEPENDENCE TREES
In this chapter we present the details of dependence tree based anomaly detection
method for detecting attacks on a computer network system. The goal of the dependence
tree based anomaly detection method is to build dependence trees that achieve high
classification accuracy in detecting five types of network traffic instances originating
from: (1) normal traffic, (2) denial-of-service attacks, (3) probing attacks, (4) user-to-root
attacks, and (5) remote-to-login attacks. The two major motivations for using dependence
trees for detecting network attacks is as follows:
•

Dependence trees have an advantage of making the classification models more
explicit with regard to features and their relationships. Such explicit
representations of relationships between features facilitate the ensuing steps of
network forensic analysis and vulnerability inspections over the feature space,
which are inevitably performed for effective corrective actions.

•

Dependence trees, being probabilistic by nature, assign probability scores
indicating the "degree" to which a network traffic instance belongs to particular
type of attack. Such quantitative assignments of scores to network traffic
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instances will assist human experts and network administrators in culling the false
positives generated by the attack detection system.
Next, we present the problem formulation for network attack detection using the
dependence tree based anomaly detection method.

7.1
Let X = (x1,x2,...,xn)

Problem Formulation

denote an ^-dimensional feature vector. The feature vector

X represents a set of n measurements recorded over a computer network (e.g., type of
service, protocol, number of source bytes, etc.). Let W = {co/,co2,...,cor} denote a set of r
classes. The set W represents five types of network traffic instances, i.e., normal, denialof-service attack, probing attack, user-to-root attack, and remote-to-login attack. We
assign an optimal label co* e W to X using the Bayes classification rule, given by
p(co* | x) = max{p(©ft | X)}

Equation 7.1

where P{(nk | X) is the posterior probability of the class cot e W given the feature vector
X. Using Bayes formula [13], the posterior probability can be expressed as a function of
class-conditional probability P[X \ tok) by

p{pk, x) =

pfoHr|a> t )

Equat.on 12

r

where P(co/.) is the prior probability of class a>k and ^ ] P(wJl )P(X | coA) is the
normalization factor that scales the posterior probability between 0 and 1. Through
Equation 7.2, the problem of classifying X into one of the r classes becomes one of
estimating the class-conditional probability function P{X | co^.). However, estimating
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P{X | o^) involves computations of (exponential) order TV", where m is the number of
features and N is the number of unique values in each feature. The exponential
complexity makes estimating P\X \ a)k) infeasible when dealing with a large number of
features, which are typically available for the anomaly detection problem. Therefore, we
estimate the class-conditional probability with a product of second-order joint probability
distributions using dependence tree approximation. The dependence tree approximation
requires at most (N2* m2) computations, which mean far fewer computations than N™ even
for moderate values of TV and m. Here, it is important to note that we build a number of
dependence trees equal to that of the classes available (i.e., five classes in our case).

7.2

Dependence Trees

Chow and Liu [31] first introduced dependence trees to approximate an nth order
discrete joint probability distribution using a product of second order discrete joint
probability distributions. Let X = (x,,x2,...,xn)

denote an ^-dimensional discrete

random feature vector. Let P\X) = P(x;, x2,..., xn) be the joint distribution of the feature
vector.

In

dependence

tree

approximation,

the joint

probability

distribution

P\xl, x2,..., xn) is approximated by P\X) as

P(X) « P{X) = f\p{xmi

| xmm }

0 < j(i) < i,

Equation 7.3

i=l

where {m1,m2,...,mr^)

is an unknown permutation of integers 1,2,...,n, P\xm \ xm

J is a

component probability in which each feature xm is conditioned on at most one variable
xm

and the component probability of the form P\xm \x0j is by definition equal to
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Figure 7.1 gives examples of two dependence trees containing four features
(x,,x?,x3,x4).

In Figure 7.1(a), the joint probability distribution P(x,,x2,x3,x4)

is

approximated by P{xl)p{x2 \x,)P{x3 \XJ)P{X4 \x,). In Figure 7.1(b), P\x1,x2,x3,x4)

is

approximated by P(x, )P(X2 | x, )P(X3 \ x, )P(X4 ) . Note that the dependence tree in (b)
illustrates a case where there can be more than one independent component, i.e., P(x ; )
and

P(x4).

©
X.

©
0)

(a)

Figure 7.1 Dependence trees approximating the joint probability distribution
P(xj,X2,X3^X4). The dependence tree in (a) approximates Pfxi^^^)
as
P(xi)P(x2\xi)P(xs\x2)P(x4\xi) and the dependence tree in (b)
approximates P(xi^X2>X3^C4) as P(xj)P(x2\xi)P(x3\x2)P(x^.

7.3
Let

Steps for Building Dependence Trees

X = {x1,x2,...,xn)

be an n-dimensional discrete feature vector. Let

,ra 2 ,...,co r ) denote a set of r classes. Let P\x,,x2,...,xl])

be the joint

distribution to be approximated. There are five steps to build a dependence tree to
approximate P{x;, x2,...,

xn).
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STEP 1)

Find the mutual information Iyx^Xj) between all pairs of features, where
[xl ,x.) are any two features in X - {x,, x2,..., xn) and i* j . The mutual
information between the feature pair \x[ ,x.) is defined as

STEP 2)

Build a complete undirected graph G with the features (x,,x2,...,xn)

as

vertices and the mutual information between the vertices as edge weights.
STEP 3)

Use Kruskal's algorithm [32] to find a maximum spanning tree in G.

STEP 4)

In the maximum spanning tree, choose any node as a root node and set the
direction of all edges outwards, pointing towards the root node.

STEP 5)

Repeat STEP 1 through STEP 4 for each class in W.

7.4

Optimality of Dependence Tree Approximation

Chow and Liu, in [31], have shown that the dependence tree with the maximum
edge weights (i.e., mutual information) gives the optimal second order approximation of
P(X) = P(x,,..., xn), the true joint probability distribution of an n-dimensional feature
vector X. A brief overview of their proof follows.
Let

P(X)

P(x) = P{xs ,...,xn).
probabilities P(x)

be

any
Then,

second
the

order
closeness

dependence
of

tree

approximation

approximation

between

of
the

and P(x) is quantified by the Kullback-Liebler divergence measure

[15], given as
r

KL(p,p)=J^P(x)\og

p{x)^
\H*)j

Equation 7.4
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With Equation 7.4, the problem of finding the optimal second order dependence tree
approximation to P(x)

is transformed into the problem of finding P(x)

which

minimizes KL\P,Pj. On replacing P{x) with the dependence tree approximation given
in Equation 7.3, the Kullback-Leibler distance between P(x) and P(x) becomes

= - Z 7 k , >*»m)+ Z " k ) - # M

E uation 7 5

q

-

where H(xm )= -£p(* m ( . Jlogifa J and tf(jr) = - ; > > ( x ) l o g P ( x ) . Because //(xm )

and i/(X) are independent of the dependence tree approximation, minimizing KL\P,P)
is equivalent to maximizing the total mutual information^l\x m ,xm

J. Thus, the

problem of finding the optimal dependence tree approximation P(x) is transformed to
that of finding a dependence tree with maximum total branch weight.
7.5

Estimating Mutual Information

Estimating mutual information between pairs of features involves estimating the
marginal and joint probabilities of features. To estimate the marginal and joint
probabilities, we use relative frequencies derived from the training samples. Let P(x.,xy.)
be the joint probability distribution of two features xt and x,. The value of P\xt,x,)

calculated as
/

p{x.

x
= u>Xj=v)

=

F(Xl=U,Xj=v)
t

is
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where F\xt = u,Xj = v) denotes the number of training samples whose feature x, is equal
to u and whose feature x j is equal to v. T denotes the total number of training samples.
Similarly, the marginal distributions of the features xt and *., that is, Pyx^ and P\x.)
are calculated as
,
F(X. =U)
I
\ Fix,. =v)
P{xt = u) = - L L _ J and p(x ; = v) = - ^ — ;
where F(xt = u) is the number of training samples whose feature x{ is equal to u and
F\x, = v) is the number of training samples whose feature x, is equal to v.

CHAPTER 8

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPENDENCE
TREE CLASSIFICATION ERROR AND
BAYES ERROR RATE
Let X = (xl,...,Xn) denote an ^-dimensional discrete random feature vector. Let
PF = {cOj,...,cor}, be a discrete random variable whose values are the class labels. Let
P(x | co) be the conditional distribution of X given W, where x = (xj,..., xn) is a value
of the feature vector X and co is a value of W. In Chow and Liu's dependence tree
approximation, the probability distribution P(x | co) is approximated by P(x | co) as
P(x | co) « P(x | co) = Y[ P{xmi | xm , co),

0 < j(i) < i,

Equation 8.1

where (m{,...,mn) is an unknown permutation of integers 1, 2, ..., n, P\xm \xm

,co) is a

component probability in which each variable xm is conditioned on at most one
variablexm

, and the component probability of the form P(xi \x0,ca) is by definition

equal to P(xt \ co). The unknown permutation is obtained using KruskaFs algorithm [32],
which finds the spanning tree with maximum pairwise mutual information between the
features. For notational simplicity, we will hereafter omit the subscript m of each variable
and represent, for example, xm as xt.
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Hellman and Raviv [33] proved that an upper bound on Bayes error rate "cr e " is

— H(G>\X),

where H(G>\X)

is the conditional entropy of class co given the n-

dimensional feature vectorX. Wong and Poon, in [34], extended Hellman and Raviv's
result (see [35] for tighter bounds on the Bayes error rate) and showed that, under certain
assumptions, Chow and Liu's dependence tree approximation procedure can be derived
by minimizing the upper bound of the Bayes error rate. Wong and Poon's result comes
from Equation (5) in their paper [34], which expands the entropy function //(co | X) and
replaces P(X\(D)

with probability distribution P(x\(o)

using the dependence tree

approximation. The equation appeared as
//(co | X) = //(co)- H(X)-

XP(co)X/.(x,,Xj{i))- £/>(»)£Ha(Xt)
co

i=l

co

Equation 8.2

i-1

where
//(co) = -£/>(co)logP(co),
(1>

H(x) =

-^P{x)\ogP(x),

'M.xJ^pi^^W
Hu(Xl)

=

-

}.

and

-^iP{xl\<a)logP{xl\(a).
Xj

The correct expansion of the conditional entropy function H{co\X) (derived in the
next section) and is given as:
/ / ( H X ) = //(co)-//(x)-£/>(co) £ / > , , X J + X P ( C O ) £ / / J X , . ) .
<o

i=l,j(i)*0

co

i=l

Equation8.3
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Equation

8.3

corrects

Equation

8.2

by

reversing

the

sign

of

the

term ^ P(co)^ Ha (Xt). Though this correction appears as a minor issue, it invalidates
the misleading idea purported by Equation 8.2 that every component probability in the
dependence tree approximation decreases the value of i/(co | X) thereby reducing the
upper bound on the Bayes error rate. The corrected equation (Equation 8.3) shows that
each component probability in the dependence tree approximation, whether in the form
ofP(x;. | x](i),(£s), j{i)*0,

or P{xi |x0,co), adds^P(<x>)Ha(Xt) to H((o\X) and does
CO

not necessarily contribute toward decreasing the upper bound on Bayes error rate.
Therefore, caution is advised when selecting component probabilities for dependence tree
approximation.
Below, we give two conditions to guarantee that every component probability in
the dependence tree approximation decreases the value of H{co\X), thereby decreasing
the upper bound on Bayes error rate.
Condition 1: In a dependence tree approximation, for each component probability of the
form P[xi | xJ(j), co), j(i) * 0, ^ P{(£>)la {X,, Xj^) should be greater than
{0

5>(coK(X,.).
CO

Condition 1 follows from expansion in Equation 8.9 in the derivation (in the next
section) and concerns with component probabilities of the form P[xj | x ;(0 ,co), j(i) =? 0 ,
in the dependence tree approximation. We explain Condition 1 with an example. Let
X = (Xl ,X2,X3)

be a three-dimensional discrete random feature vector. Let
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P(X, \U>)P{X2 \XI,a)p(X3

|co) be the dependence tree approximation of P(X|co). In

this dependence tree approximation, there is one component probability of the form
P\xt. | x y(0 ,co), i.e.,

P{X2 | X\,co).

Expansion in Equation 8.9 shows that each

component probability of the form P[xi | xj{i), co) adds ^ ( © ^ ( J r , ) to

H((o\X).

CO

Therefore,

P(X2\X

,,<£>) adds

£ > ( © ) # „ (X 2 )

^ ^ ( © X o { X 2 , X , ) is greater Xhsa^PioijHa{X2),

to#(<y|x).

However,

if

then from expansion in Equation 8.9

we see that the presence of component probability P(X2 \ X,, co) in the dependence tree
approximation decreases the value of i/(co| X), thereby decreasing the bound on Bayes
error rate.
Condition 2: In a dependence tree approximation, for each component probability of the
form

P{xi | x0,co),0 <i< n , there must be a nonempty set lt,\lt \<n , of component

probabilities of the form P(xs \ x,., co), 0<s<n,

so that ^ ^(co)^ Ia {Xs, Xi) is greater
co

than

n

Y^PWM)CO

Condition 2 follows from Equation. 8.10 in the next section and concerns with
component probabilities of the form P(xj \x0,(o).
example. Let X = (Xl,X2,X3,X4)
vector. Let

be a four-dimensional discrete random feature

P(X!\(i))p(X2\Xl,(o)p(X3\X,,(o)p(X4\co)

approximation of P(X\(o).

We explain Condition 2 with an

be the dependence tree

In this dependence tree (or more precisely, dependence

forest) approximation, there are two component probabilities of the form P\xi \ x0, co),
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i.e., P(X, | co) andP(X4 |co). Equation 8.10 shows that P(x, | co) and P(X4 | co) add
^/•(©^(X/)

and ^P(co)/7 <i) (X 4 ) to H{(o\x).

CO

NOW, consider the component

(0

probability i , (X / | co). From Condition 2, /, contains all the component probabilities
conditioned

on

If^Pfoft^X^X^

Xx,

i.e.,

/, = {P(X2 | X,, co), / > (X J | X,, co)}.

+ I^X^X^^Pfoty^X,),

CO

then from Equation 8.10 we see

CO

that the presence of the variable X, decreases //(co | X), thereby decreasing the upper
bound on the Bayes error rate. However, the component probability P\X4 | co) does not
satisfy Condition 2 because /4 is an empty set. Therefore, the presence of P\X4 \ co)
certainly increases i^(co | X), thereby increasing the upper bound on the Bayes error rate.
Consequently, the variable X4 may be omitted when approximating P\X

8.1

\ co).

Derivation Relating Bayes Error Rate To
Dependence Tree Classification Error

It is known [15] that
//(co | X) = //(co)- l(X, co).

Equation 8.4

Using the definition of mutual information [5], /(X,co) in Equation 8.4 can be expanded
as
//(co|X)= //(co)-£/>(*,co)logP(x,co) + ][>(x,co)logP(x) + £/>(;<;,co)log/>(co) Equation 8.5
X,(0

X,<Q

X,(0

By the definition of entropy
^ P(x, co)logP(x) = Y, P(x)logP(x) = -H{X)
.r,co

x

and
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X P(x, co)log P(co) = X P(co)log P(co) = -//(<D) .
Therefore, Equation 8.5 can be written as
H(<a | X) = -H{X) - £ P(x, co)log P(x, co) = - # ( * ) - £ ^(©)£ ^

I «)log(P(* | co)p(co))
Equation 8.6

Using dependence tree approximation in Equation 8.1, log(P(x | co)P(co)) in Equation 8.6
is replaced bylog(p(x | co)P(co)), so that
H(<o\X) = -H(X) + //(co) - X P(co)£ P(x | co)£ log P(X,. | x .(0, a>), 0 < j(i) < i

co

x

i=l,j(i)*0
TERM 1

n

.

.

- ^ P(co)^ P(x I co) ^ log P(x, I x y(0 , co).

Equation 8.7

i=i,m=o
TERM 2

Term I (sign included) in Equation 8.7 contains the component probabilities of the
form P(x, | xm,co), j(i) < 1, and j(i) & 0. Term II (sign included) contains the remaining
component probabilities of the form P(x, | x0, co) = P(x,. | co). Term I can be expanded as

-Z^)2>(*l«)

t

togp/^w0'"!

r

I ^ ) Z ^ i c o )

ZlogPklco).
Equation 8.8

Since P(X,, xm | co) and P(x,. | co) are components (marginal distributions) of P(x | co),
we know that

^

P(x,. | co)P(x (0 | co) ^

P(x. | co)P(x (/) | co]
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X P{x | ©)log P{xt | <D) = £ Pfo | co)log P(x, I co).
.Y

.V,-

Therefore, the expansion in Equation 8.8 can be rewritten as

-Z^(»)
0)

I/>,,^(o)+2>(«)
i=l,j(i)*0

co

2 X W -

Equation 8.9

i=l,j(i)*0

Expansion in Equation 8.9 shows that each component probability of the form
p(xi \xj(i),(j$),j(i)*0,

adds ^P(co)// a {X i ) to //(co|X). Now, consider Term II in
CO

Equation

8.7.

Let

there

be

K

component

probabilities

of

the

form

P{x, | x0, co) = P(x. | co). Then, Term II can be written as
- X ^ ( « ) ) E ^ | c o ) i l o g ^ |co) = ~ £ / > ( « ) £ £ P ( X , . |a>)logP(*, |CO) = £ P ( C O ) £ / / U ( X , )
Equation 8.10
where K>\

and K <n

from the definition of dependence tree approximation in

Equation. 8.1. Equation 8.10 shows that each component probability of the form
P(XJ \x0,eo) adds ^P(p)H

a{Xi)

to H(a>\X).

By substituting Equation 8.9 and

Equation 8.10 for Term I and Term II respectively, Equation 8.7 becomes
//(co | X) = //(co) - H(X) - X P(co) £ /„ (x,, XJ(i)) + J P(co)£ // W (X,).
co

i=I,j{i)*0

co

i=l

CHAPTER 9

MAXIMUM RELEVANCE MINIMUM
REDUNDANCY FEATURE
SELECTION
Feature selection (in the context of classification) is the process of identifying the
most characterizing features that minimize classification error [36]. Let dataset D
contain

M

samples

and Xt = {xl, x2,..., xn).

with

^-dimensional

Each sample in

D

features,

i.e.,

D=

\X,,X2,...,XM}

belongs to one of the classes in

,co 2 ,...,co r }. The feature selection problem is to find a subset of k features that
minimize classification error. One of the most popular methods of feature selection,
known as the Maximum Relevance feature selection [37], selects features with the
highest relevance to the target class W. In Maximum Relevance feature selection,
"relevance" is usually characterized using correlation or mutual information between
features and the classes. Mutual information is preferred over correlation because
correlation captures only linear dependencies between features and classes where as
mutual information captures linear as well as nonlinear dependencies (see [16]). A
detailed investigation of the advantages of mutual information over correlation is given in
[38], [39], and [40]. Next, we briefly discuss Maximum Relevance feature selection.
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9.1

Maximum Relevance Feature Selection

In Maximum Relevance feature selection, the objective is to identify a subset of
k features among a set of n features such that the mutual information between the k
features and the class is maximized. In other words, Maximum Relevance feature
selection maximizes

/(*>)=IL^>).O(^;
X

W

where X' is a feature vector of size k. Identifying maximally relevant features by
calculating I\X ,W) is computationally prohibitive, especially when there are a large
number of features, because (1) computing I\X ,W) requires estimating higher order
probability terms, which require a minimum of M*2n computations assuming that there
are M training samples and that each of the n features has exactly two values and (2) the
consideration of all possible subsets of features requires computing I\X ,W) for

number of times. One is therefore forced to choose approximations to Maximum
Relevance feature selection. A possible way to approximate Maximum Relevance feature
selection is to calculate the mutual information between the individual features and class
and then, incrementally select k features with the highest relevance, so that the selected
k features maximize

However, it is likely that the k features selected through Maximum Relevance
feature selection may contain large dependencies. That means that features may highly
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depend on each other, and therefore removing any one of them may not significantly
change the overall classification error. To eliminate such redundancy but at the same time
retain relevance of the features to the classes, Maximum Relevance Minimum
Redundancy feature selection is used. A brief description of Maximum Relevance
Minimum Redundancy feature selection follows.

9.2

Maximum Relevance Minimum
Redundancy (MRMR)

Let F be a set containing n features {x,,x2,...,xn}.

Let S(S cz F) be a set of k-1

features which jointly have the largest dependency on the class variable W. The
objective of Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) is to add the kth
feature x. from F into S so that x ; maximizes
l(xj, W) - y-T ]T l(Xj, Xj),

ieF

Equation 9.1

HY/eS

From Equation 9.1, it is clear that a feature is selected from F not only if it maximizes the
mutual information with the class variable W, but also if it is unpredictable by the
current set of already selected features in S. The criterion in Equation 9.1 can be applied
incrementally to select a set of k features from a set of n features that optimally
characterize the class variable W. The steps for performing MRMR feature selection are:
1) (Initialization Step) Set F to contain the initial set of n features; S containing the
final set of k features is initialized to empty.
2) Compute the mutual information between W and each of the individual features
inF.
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3) (Selection of the first feature) Select the first feature x. that maximizes /(x,., W);
Remove xt from F and add x. to S.
4) Repeat until |S| = k
a. Compute the mutual information between pairs of variables I\xj ,Xj) such
that x(. e F and x. e S, if it is not already available.
b. (Selection of the next feature) Select feature xi e F, which maximizes the
criterion l(xi,W)-T—i^lI\xi,Xj);a.dd

xt to S; remove x, from/7.

In several studies (see [16] and [37]), the above procedure for MRMR feature selection
has been empirically shown to decrease classification error and improve classification
results. However, until now, the criterion used in MRMR feature selection (Equation 9.1)
has been used as heuristic, without formal proof showing how the criterion is
instrumental in reducing classification error. In the next section, we present a set of
derivations to show that the MRMR feature selection procedure, under some
assumptions, gives an upper bound on the Bayes error rate.
9.3

Relationship Between MRMR Feature
Selection and Bayes Error Rate

In this section we derive the relationship between MRMR feature selection and
Bayes error rate and show that the criterion of MRMR feature selection (Equation 9.1) is
an approximation to an upper bound of Bayes error rate. Let X = (X, ,X2,...,X„)

denote

an ^-dimensional discrete random feature vector. Let W = (co/,co2,...,con) be a discrete
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random variables whose values are the class labels. Let x = (x,,x?,...,xn)

be a value of

the feature vector X and co is a value of W.
Assumption 9.1 The features xl,x2,...,xn_1

are independent features and

x,,x2,..., xn_j are conditionally independent given the feature xn.
Lemma 9.1 If x,,x2,...,xn_,

are independent features and if x,,x2,...,xn_1

conditionally independent given the feature xn (Assumption 8.4.1), then
n-1

P\xn \x1,x2,...,xn_I)

= -j—

y|„_2 •

Proof:
From Assumption 9.1, it follows that
P(x,,x2,...,xn_j) = P{x.j)P(X2)...P(xn_j) and
P(x,,x2,...,xn_,

| xJ = P(x, | x„)P{x2 \xj...P{xn_,

Equation 9.2
\xn).

Equation 9.3

Using Bayes formula, Equation 9.3 can be expanded as
p/
r x x

r

r

\ n 2T">xn-l

| r ^ ,., [Pi*. I *, M * „ I *, )• • • HX„ I *„-, )] [Pi*, Y{X2 )• • • ^ - 7 )]
I Xn)~

r_,/

Y\„-l

IA*JJ
Equation 9.4
From Bayes formula, we have
P(x„\x,,x,,...,x

,) = p(x>'x2>->x»-, \X„)HXJ

Equation9.5

Substituting Equation 9.4 in Equation 9.5, we get
P(Y

.

r

r

x_ [P{x„ \ x,)p(xn \x2)...P(x„

\ xn__,)]

[Pjx,)P{x2)...P(x„_,)]

Equation 9.6

are
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Using Equation 9.1 in Equation 9.6, we get
n-l

P{*„

•*"/ ; - * 2 '

-

„-,)-

Kxj^Mxjx2)...p(xjx„_/)]_n^i^)
H*Jr2

W.Y2

••>•*,

Thus, Lemma 9.1 is proved.
Lemma 9.2 If x,,x2,...,xn_,

are independent features and if x,,x2,...,xn_,

are

conditionally independent given the feature xn (Assumption 9.1), then the conditional
entropy function H(xn \x,,x2,..., xn_,) is equal to
H{xn)-%l{Xi,xn),
where l{xl,xn) is the mutual information between features xt and xn.
Proof:
It is well known (see [15]) that the conditional entropy function H(xn

\x,,x2,...,xn_,)

can be expanded as
H(xn \x„x2,...,xn_,)

=-

^tP[x1,x2,...,x,,)logP(xll

\x,,x2,...,xn_,).

Equation 9.7

x,,x,,...,x„

From Lemma 9.1, P(xn\x1,x2,...,xn_1)

in Equation 9.7 can be replaced by

n-l

n p ki^)
•, so that
K*jr
1=7

( n-\

" \Xn I Xl'

X

2 i • • •' Xn-\ ) ~

2-1 V*l' X2 ' • • •' Xn )*®8\
x,,x2,...,x„

]>oor
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n-l

= ~

X

TA 1

X

X

> 2>'~> n)^}0gP(xn

| X,.) + (n-2)

YAX>'X2>•

• •'Xn)l°^iXn)

«-;

n-l

= YjH(xn \xt)-(n-2)H{xn)

Equation 9.

where H(xn) is the entropy and H(xn \ xt) is the conditional entropy defined as

#(0 = -I^>gP(xJand
x

n

H(Xn\Xi)=-TAXn>Xi)l0&iXn

I Xi)

x

n >•*?'

respectively. It is known (see [15]) that the conditional entropy H(xn \x() can be
expanded as
H(xn \Xi) = H(xn)-l(xi,xn)

where •*\xi>Xn)~ ?f\xi'xn)^SZ7

Equation 9.9

Vw \ is the mutual information between the

features x. and xn. By substituting Equation 9.9 in Equation 9.8, we get
n-l

n-l

H(xn\x„x2,...,xn_,) = YdH(xn)-Ydl(xi,xH)-(n-2)H(xn)
i=l

=

i=l

{n-l)H{Xy{n-2)H{xn)-Yl{xi,x„)
i=l

=

H(xn)-^(xi,xlt)
i=l

Thus, Lemma 9.2 is proved.
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Assumption 9.2 The features
Lemma 9.3 If x,,x2,...,xn

independent.

are independent features (Assumption 9.2) and co is the class

label associated with the feature vector (x ; ,x 7 ,...,x n ), then the joint entropy function
H[(i),xl,x2,...,xn)

is equal to

#(ffl)+S#M-ZJfa*,)
Proof:
By the chain rule of entropy (see [15]), the joint entropy function H\o>,x1,x2,...,xn)

can

be written as
H(a,xJ,x2,...,xn)

= H((i))+ H(X, | co) + H(x2 | X,,CO)H

\-H{xn I

xl,x2,...,xn_,,a)
Equation 9.10

If the features x,, x2,..., xn are independent (by Assumption 9.2), then
H(xn

YJP(XnX2>--->Xn>(i))logP{Xn

\x„X2,...,Xn_„<a)=-

I XI >X2 > • • •» Xn-1» ® )

* ; , J T 2 >•••»*„ >©

=~

Z P ( X i' X 2v,^„,C>)logP(x„ | CO)
X / , J : 2 , . . . , * „ ,a>

= - Z^'^g^ N
= H(xn | co)
Equation 9.11
Similarly,
H\x2 I x7, co) = H\x2 | co)
:
H X

( n-l

\X,>X2>X3--->Xn-2>(£>)=H(Xn-l

Equation 9.12
I' 00 )

From Equation 9.11 and Equation 9.12, Equation 9.10 becomes
H((0,x!,x2,...,xn)

= H(co) + H(xl |co) + //(x 2 | <»)+••• + H{xn | co) Equation9.13
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It is known (see [15]) that H{xi | co) can be expanded as //(*,. )-/(co, A:,.). Therefore,
Equation 9.13 can be written as
n

H(a,xnx2,...,xn)

=

n

H((i))+YJH(xi)-YJl(®,xi)
i=l

i=l

Thus, Lemma 9.3 is proved.
Theorem 9.1 The Maximum Relevance Minimal Redundancy (MRMR) feature
selection procedure, which maximizes the criterion
k

k

i=l

1=2

i-l

,

>

j=l

minimizes an upper bound on the Bayes Error rate.
Proof:
Hellman and Raviv in [33] showed that
ve <-H((Q I X),

Equation 9.14

where o~e is the Bayes error rate and H(co | X) is the class conditional entropy. Equation
9.14 shows that greater the value of H{(o\X),

the greater is the upper bound on the

Bayes error rate. Therefore, to minimize classification error, one needs to minimize the
class conditional entropy //(co | X). It is known (see [15]) that
H(®\X)
Because

l(X;(n)

=

H{(o)-l(X;<o).

is a negative term, minimizing

i/(co | X)

maximizing l{X; co). As x = (x,, x2,..., xn), we have
l(X;a>) =
It is known (see [15]) that l(xl,x2,...,xn;(o)

l(xnx2,...,xn;o).
can be expanded as

is equivalent

to
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n

_n

/(jc7,x7,...,xn;co)= ^T//(x ( \xj_,,...,x1)-'^H{xi
(=/

| JC(._; ,...,*,, co)

Equation 9.15

!=/
TERM 1

TERM 2

TERM 1 in Equation 9.15 can be written as
) = H(X,) + H(X2 \X,)+H(X3

\X,,X2)+

— + H(X„

\x,,x2,...,xn_,)
Equation 9.16

From Lemma 9.2, we have
H(x2 \X, ) = H(x2) - l(x2 ,xj)
H(x3 I x2,x,) =
H(X3)-I(X3,X])-I(X3,X2)
Equation 9.17
H(xn \xI,x2,...,xn_,)

=

H{xn)-YJl{xi,xn)

Now using Equation 9.17, Equation 9.16 can be rewritten as
n

n

n

X H(x> I xi-x»• • • > x i) = Z H(xt)1=1

i=l

i-\

,

.

Z Z 7U'x;)
1=2

Equation 9.18

j=\

Replacing TERM 1 in Equation 9.15 using Equation 9.18 gives
n

n

i-\

I x

.

x

.

H x

l(x\,x2,...,xn-,co) = YJH{xl)-YJYj \ i> j)-Yj ( i
1=1

n

\x,.i,...,xlfe))

Equation 9.19

i=2 j=\
TERM 1

TERM 2

From Equation 9.19, it is straight forward to see that maximizing TERM 1 results
in maximizing l(xl,x2,...,xn;o)),

thereby minimizing the upper bound on Bayes error

rate. Here, we point out that TERM 1 does not involve class information and therefore,
the MRMR feature selection based on maximizing TERM 1 is an unsupervised version of
MRMR feature selection. Now, TERM 2 in Equation 9.19 can be written as
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YjHixi

\xi_,,-..,x,,(i>) = H(xI \(o)+H(x2 \xl,®)+--- + H(xn |
Equation 9.20

It is known (see [15]) that
H(oi,x1,x2,...,xt!)

= H((i})+H(x1 \o>)+H(x2 \X1,<Q)+--- + H(XII

\x,,x2,...,xn_na>).
Equation 9.21

Using Equation 9.21, Equation 9.20 can be written as
^ H\xi | xt_,,...,x,,
/=/

co) = //(co, x 7 , JC2 ,..., xn)- //(co).

Equation 9.22

From Lemma 9.3, we have
n

n

//(co, x,, x2,..., xn) = //(co) + ^ H{xi) - ^ /(co, xt).
i=l

Equation 9.23

i=l

From Equation 9.23, Equation 9.22 can be written as
n

n

n

£ H{xi | x,_, ,...,x1,®) = YJH{xi)-Yj
i=l

^

i=l

x

t)

Equation 9.24

i=l

Now, substituting Equation 9.24 for TERM 2 in Equation 9.19, we get
n

l(xi,x2,...,xn)0))

n

i—l

,

v

n

n

= ^H(xi)-^^jl(xi,xJ)-YJH(xi)-^l(co,xi)

Equation 9.25

1=2 y=l

On simplifying Equation 9.25, we get
n

i-1

Equation 9.26

l(xnx2,...,xH;G))=^il(to,xl)-J^Yil(xl,Xj).
i=2

j=l

Substituting Equation 9.26, in Equation 9.14
I 1

'

2

//(co)-

n

i-1

X/(co,*,)-XI/(*,.,x,)
1=2 y = /

Equation 9.27
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From Equation 9.27, it is straight forward to see that any set of A: features (k < n) that
f
maximize the criterion for MRMR feature selection, i.e.,

E7(ro>*<)-£E7(*/»*y)

V •='

also maximize

1=2 .1=1

,xn;<X)), thereby minimizing an upper bound on Bayes error

rate. Thus, we prove Theorem 9.1.

CHAPTER 10
THE KDD CUP 1999 INTRUSION
DETECTION DATASET
The dependence tree based anomaly detection method is tested using the
benchmark KDD Cup 1999 dataset [41]. The entire KDD Cup 1999 dataset contains
about 5,000,000 connection records. However, a concise dataset known as the "10%
training" dataset has been provided to allow for faster training of anomaly and intrusion
detection systems. We use the 10% training dataset. The 10% training dataset consists of
494, 021 connection records, each record labeled as normal or as a specific attack type.
There are 22 different attack types in the training dataset. The KDD Cup 1999 test dataset
contains 311, 030 connection records. The test dataset contains 17 additional attack types
that are not present in the training data.
Each connection record in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset contains 41 features and a
label indicating whether the connection is normal or an attack. The 41 features fall into
three categories: (1) basic features, (2) content features, and (3) temporal features. A brief
description of the 41 KDD Cup 1999 dataset features is provided in the following section.
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10.1 Features in KDD Cup 1999 Dataset
Here we give a brief description of features in the KDD Cup 1999 datasets. The
first nine features are known as "basic" features and contain intrinsic information of a
single network connection. The basic features are described in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1 Basic features of KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Feature Name
Duration
Protocol
Service
Source Bytes
Destination Bytes
Flag
Land
Wrong Fragment
Urgent

Description
Length (number of seconds) of the connection
Type of the protocol, e.g.top,udp, etc.
Network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet, etc.
Number of data bytes from source to destination
Number of data bytes from destination to source
Normal or error status of the connection
1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise
Number of "wrong" fragments
Number of urgent packets

The next thirteen features in a KDD Cup 1999 connection record are known as
"content" features. These features use domain knowledge to asses the payload of TCP
packets. A brief description of content features is given in Table 10.2.

Table 10.2 Content features of KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
No.
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20

Feature Name
Hot
Num failed logins
Logged in
Num compromised
Root shell
Su attempted
Num root
Num file creations
Num shells
Num access files
Num outbound cmds

Description
Number of "hot"' indicators
Number of failed login attempts
1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise
Number of compromised" conditions
1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise
1 if "su root'" command attempted; 0 otherwise
Number of "root"' accesses
Number of file creation operations
Number of shell prompts
Number of operations on access control files
Number of outbound commands in an ftp session
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21
22

Is hot login
Is_guest_login

1 if the login belongs to the "hot" list; 0 otherwise
1 if the login is a "guest" 'login; 0 otherwise

The next nineteen features in a connection record are known as "temporal"
features. These features are collected over a 2 second time-window. A brief description
of content features is given in Table 10.3.
Table 10.3 Temporal features of KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
No.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Feature Name

Description
Number of connections to the same host as the
Count
current connection
Serror rate
Percentage of connections that have "SYN"' errors
Rerror rate
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors
Same srv rate
Percentage of connections to the same service
Diff srv rate
Percentage of connections to different services
Number of connections to the same service as the
Srvcount
current connection
Srv serror rate
Percentage of connections that have "SYN" errors
Srv rerror rate
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors
Srv diff host rate
Percentage of connections to different hosts
Number of connections to the same destination host
dst_host_count
as the current connection
Percentage of connections to the same service at the
dst_host_srv_count
destination host
Percentage of connections to different services at
dst_host_same_srv_rate
the destination host
Percentage of connections to different services at
Dst_host_diff_srv_rate
the destination host
Number of connections to the same port at
dst host_same_src_port rate
destination host
Percentage of connections to different hosts at the
dst host srv diff host rate
destination host
Percentage of connections that have "SYN" errors
dst_host_serror_rate
at the destination host
Percentage of connections that have "SYN" errors
dst_host_srv_serror_rate
at the destination host
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors at
dst_host_rerror_rate
the destination host
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors at
dsthostsrvrerrorrate
the destination host
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It is to be noted here that all continuous features in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset
(i.e., Duration, Source Bytes, Destination Bytes, and all "content" features) are
discretized using Fayyad and Irani's discretization method [50] before being input to the
dependence tree based anomaly detection method.
Table 10.4 gives the number of normal and attack connection records in the KDD
Cup 1999 training and test datasets. There are four classes of attacks in KDD Cup 1999:
(1) denial-of-service (DoS) attacks (e.g., "syn flood"), (2) surveillance and other probing
(Probe) attacks (e.g., "port scanning"), (3) unauthorized access attacks to local superuser
privileges (U2R) (e.g., "buffer overflow"), and (4) unauthorized access from a remote
machine (R2L) (e.g., "guess password"). The training data contains 24 different attack
types that fall in to one of the four classes. The KDD Cup 1999 test data includes an
addition 14 attack types that are not present in the training data.

Table 10.4 Distribution of normal and attack connections in the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Dataset

Normal

DOS

PROBE

U2R

R2L

Total

Training
Testing

97278
60593

391458
229853

4107
4166

52
228

1126
16189

494021
311029

The major motivations for using the benchmark KDD Cup 1999 datasets are:
•

The KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been used popularly as a standard for

comparing the performance of intrusion detection methods. This allows us to
compare the performance of our dependence tree based anomaly detection method
with the performance of the other intrusion detection methods reported in recent
literature.
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•

The data instances in K D D Cup 1999 test dataset are labeled, making it possible

for us to verify the detection accuracy and false positive rate of our dependence tree
based anomaly detection method.
•

The KDD Cup 1999 test dataset contains 17 additional attacks that are not

included in the training dataset. This feature of the dataset allows us to gauge the
performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method on unseen or
new attacks.

CHAPTER 11
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this chapter we present the results of MRMR feature selection and the results of
the dependence tree based anomaly detection method on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
11.1 Results of MRMR Feature Selection on
KDD Cup 1999 Dataset
In Table 11.1, we give the results of MRMR supervised feature selection (see
Equation 9.26) on KDD Cup 1999 datasets. Each feature in Table 11.1 is ranked based on
its relevance to the class variable.
Table 11.1 The first eight features in KDD Cup 1999 datasets selected
through MRMR supervised feature selection.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Feature No.
5
14
6
32
23
12
37
31

Feature Name
Source Bytes
Root shell
Flag
Dst host count
Count
Logged in
Dst host srv diff host rate
Srv diff host rate

74
In Table 11.2, we give the results of M R M R unsupervised

feature selection (see

Equation 9.19) on KDD Cup 1999 datasets. Each feature in Table 11.2 is ranked based on
its entropy value.
Table 11.2 The first eight features in KDD Cup 1999 datasets selected
through MRMR unsupervised feature selection.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Feature No.
23
24
5
33
3
35
34
36

Feature Name
Count
Srv Count
Source Bytes
Dst host srv count
Service
Dst host diff srv rate
Dst host same srv rate
Dst host same src port rate

Only eight of the 41 KDD Cup 1999 features have been incrementally selected by
both the supervised and unsupervised MRMR feature selection methods. For the
remaining features, the supervised and unsupervised MRMR feature selection criteria
(Equation 9.26 and Equation. 9.19) incurred negative values, meaning that the remaining
features had more redundancy than relevance to classification. Next, we present the
results of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method on the features selected
through the supervised and unsupervised versions of MRMR feature selection method.
11.2 Dependence Tree Results
The performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method is
gauged using three measures: (1) detection accuracy, which is the percentage of instances
correctly detected in each of the five classes (i.e., normal, denial-of-service attack, probe
attack, user-to-root attack, and remote-to-login attack), (2) false positive rate, which is the
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percentage of normal instances detected as attacks, and (3) the total attack detection
accuracy, which is the percentage of all attacks correctly detected. Next, we present the
results of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method using the features
selected by supervised MRMR feature selection method (see Table 11.1).
11.2.1 Dependence Tree Results
with Supervised MRMR
Selection
In this section we present the class-wise detection accuracy of dependence trees
built using the features selected by the supervised MRMR selection algorithm. Figure
11.1 shows dependence trees with two features: Source (5) and Root_shell (14). The
class-wise detection accuracy is 93.68% for Normal, 68.9% for DoS, 94.89% for Probe,
17.54% for U2R, and 3.5% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 91.11% at a
false positive rate of 6.31%o.

Figure 11.1 Dependence trees with two features (5,14) for classifying Normal, DOS,
Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Figure 11.2 shows dependence trees with three features: Source (5), Rootshell
(14), and Flag (6). The class-wise detection accuracy for the dependence trees in Figure
11.2 is 97.45% for Normal, 68.91% for DoS, 92.51% for gQProbe, 17.98% for U2R, and
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0.01% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 89.40% at a false positive rate of
2.53%.

Figure 11.2 Dependence trees with three features (5,14, 6) for classifying Normal,
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Figure 11.3 shows dependence trees with four features: Source (5), Root_shell
(14), Flag (6), and Dst_host_count (32). The class-wise detection accuracy for the
dependence trees in Figure 11.3 is 97.87% for Normal, 68.91% for DoS, 91.14% for
Probe, 12.28% for U2R, and 2.13% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is
89.56% at a false positive rate of 2.13%.

@
Normal

©

©
DoS

©
Probe

U2R

R2L

Figure 11.3 Dependence trees with four features (5,14, 6,32) for classifying Normal,
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
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Figure 11.4 shows dependence trees with five features: Source (5), Rootshell
(14), Flag (6), Dst_host_count (32), and Count (23). The class-wise detection accuracy
for the dependence trees in Figure 11.4 is 97.89% for Normal, 93.83% for DoS, 81.18%
for Probe, 12.28% for U2R, and 0.01% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is
88.30% at a false positive rate of 2.13%.

Normal

DoS

Probe

U2R

R2L

Figure 11.4 Dependence trees with five features (5,14, 6,32, 23) for classifying
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Figure 11.5 shows dependence trees with six features: Source (5), Rootshell
(14), Flag (6), Dst_host_count (32), Count (23), and Logged_in (12). The class-wise
detection accuracy for the dependence trees in Figure 11.5 is 97.95% for Normal, 93.83%
for DoS, 81.93% for Probe, 9.658% for U2R, and 0.01% for R2L. The total attack
detection accuracy is 88.31% at a false positive rate of 2.0%.

Figure 11.5 Dependence trees with six features (5,14, 6, 32, 23,12) for classifying
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
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Figure 11.6 shows dependence trees with seven features: Source (5), Rootshell
(14),

Flag

(6),

Dsthostcount

(32),

Count

(23),

Logged_in

(12),

and

Dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate (37). The class-wise detection accuracy for the dependence
trees in Figure 11.6 is 98.90% for Normal, 93.82% for DoS, 77.2% for Probe, 9.21% for
U2R, and 0.03% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 88.21% at a false
positive rate of 1.1%.

Figure 11.6 Dependence trees with seven features (5,14, 6,32,23,12,37) for
classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in
KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Figure 11.7 shows dependence trees with eight features: Source (5), Rootshell
(14),

Flag

(6),

Dst_host_count

(32),

Count

(23),

Logged_in

(12),

D s t h o s t s r v d i f f h o s t r a t e (37), and Srv_diff_host_rate (31). The class-wise detection
accuracy for the dependence trees in Figure 11.7 is 98.76%) for Normal, 93.81%) for DoS,
68.24%, for Probe, 9.21% for U2R, and 0.01% for R2L. The total attack detection
accuracy is 88.07%> at a false positive rate of 1.2%.
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Figure 11.7 Dependence trees with eight features (5,14, 6, 32, 23,12, 37, 31)
for classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in
KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
11.2.2 Dependence Tree Results with
Unsupervised MRMR
Selection
In this section we present the class-wise detection accuracy of dependence trees
built using the features selected by the unsupervised MRMR feature selection algorithm.
Figure 11.8 shows dependence trees with two features: Count (23) and Srvcount (24).
The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.8 are 60.00%
for Normal, 81.16% for DoS, 58.74% for Probe, 86.40% for U2R, and 23.92% for R2L.
The total attack detection accuracy is 97.13% at a false positive rate of 40.00%.

Normal

DoS

Probe

U2R

R2L

Figure 11.8 Dependence trees with two features (23,24) for classifying Normal,
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
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Figure 11.9 shows dependence trees with three features: Count (23), Srvcount
(24), and Source (5). The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence trees in
Figure 11.9 are 92.06% for Normal, 92.90% for DoS, 73.93% for Probe, 27.19% for
U2R, and 16.17% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 90.85% at a false
positive rate of 7.94%.

Normal

DoS

Probe

U2R

R2L

Figure 11.9 Dependence trees with three features (23, 24, 5) for classifying Normal,
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Figure 11.10 shows dependence trees with four features: Count (23), Srvcount
(24), Source (5), and D s t h o s t s r v c o u n t (33). The class-wise detection accuracies for
the dependence trees in Figure 11.10 are 98.79% for Normal, 92.64% for DoS, 68.72%
for Probe, 42.11% for U2R, and 0.43% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is
87.92% at a false positive rate of 1.2%.

Figure 11.10 Dependence trees with four features (23, 24, 5, 33) for classifying
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
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Figure 11.11 shows dependence trees with five features: Count (23), Srvcount
(24), Source (5), Dst_host_srv_count (33), and Service (3). The class-wise detection
accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.11 are 99.50% for Normal, 92.82% for
DoS, 72.30% for 8Probe, 8.33% for U2R, and 0.31% for R2L. The total attack detection
accuracy is 87.85% at a false positive rate of 0.49%.

Figure 11.11 Dependence trees with five features (23, 24, 5, 33, 3) for classifying
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Figure 11.12 shows dependence trees with six features: Count (23), Srv_count
(24), Source (5), D s t h o s t s r v c o u n t (33), Service (3), and Dst_host_diff_srv_rate (35).
The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.12 are 99.64%
for Normal, 93.88% for DoS, 59.82% for Probe, 3.07% for U2R, and 0.98% for R2L. The
total attack detection accuracy is 87.57%) at a false positive rate of 0.36%.
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Normal

DoS

Probe

U2R

R2L

Figure 11.12 Dependence trees with six features (23,24, 5,33,3,35) for classifying
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Figure 11.13 shows dependence trees with seven features: Count (23), Srvcount
(24), Source (5), Dst_host_srv_count (33), Service (3), Dsthostdiffsrvrate (35), and
Dst_host_same_srv_rate (34). The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence
trees in Figure 11.3 are 99.70% for Normal, 93.62% for DoS, 61.69% for Probe, 3.07%
for U2R, and 0.97% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 87.45% at a false
positive rate of 0.30%.

Figure 11.13 Dependence trees with seven features (23, 24, 5, 33, 3, 35, 34) for
classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in
KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
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Figure 11.14 shows dependence trees with seven features: Count (23), Srv_count
(24), Source (5), D s t h o s t s r v c o u n t (33), Service (3), Dst_host_diff_srv_rate (35),
Dst_host_same_srv_rate (34), and Dst_host_same_src_port_rate (36). The class-wise
detection accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.14 are 99.76% for Normal,
93.65% for DoS, 57.73% for Probe, 3.51% for U2R, and 1.02% for R2L. The total attack
detection accuracy is 87.38% at a false positive rate of 0.24%.

Figure 11.14 Dependence trees with eight features (23,24, 5,33,3,35,34,36)
for classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in
KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
11.3 Comparison with Naive Baves and ID3 Anomaly
Detection Methods
In this section, we compare the performance of dependence tree based anomaly
detection method with the performance of naive Bayes [13] and ID3 [14] anomaly
detection using the KDD Cup 1999 features selected from supervised and unsupervised
MRMR feature selection.
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11.3.1 Results with Supervised
MRMR Feature Selection
Table 11.3 gives the detection accuracies and false positive rates obtained by
three methods: (1) dependence tree based anomaly detection (DTree), (2) naive Bayes
(NB), and (3) ID3 decision tree (ID3) on KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The features in Table
11.3 are obtained using the supervised MRMR feature selection method.

Table 11.3 Results of Dependence Tree based anomaly detection (DTree), Naive
Bayes (NB) anomaly detection, and ID3 anomaly detection on KDD Cup 1999
features selected by the supervised MRMR feature selection method.
Features
5,14

5, 14,6
5, 14, 6,
32
5, 14, 6,
32,23
5, 14, 6,
32,23, 12
5, 14, 6,
32, 23,
12,37
5, 14, 6,
32, 23,
12,37,31

Method
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3

DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3

Normal
93.68
98.50
98.46
97.47
99.40
98.81
97.87
99.50
98.81
97.89
98.70
97.80
97.95
98.60
97.80
98.90
98.60
97.97
98.76
98.63
99.65

DoS
68.90
94.60
94.58
68.91
94.30
94.28
68.91
94.20
94.24
93.83
97.10
94.26
93.83
97.10
94.26
93.82
97.10
94.27
93.81
97.01
94.27

Probe
94.89
17.70
17.69
92.51
17.90
24.89
91.14
19.80
18.36
81.18
26.90
69.56
81.93
35.40
69.49
77.20
30.30
69.49
68.24
31.04
69.16

U2R
17.54
9.20
8.77
17.98
11.00
6.14
12.28
9.20
5.26
12.28
9.20
5.26
9.65
9.20
3.51
9.21
10.10
4.83
9.21
10.53
4.82

R2L
3.50
0.40
0.36
0.02
0
0.02
0.02
0
0.02
0.02
0
0.03
0.02
0
0.01
0.04
0.80
0.03
0.02
1.15
0.02

TAD
91.11
87.14
87.14
89.40
86.83
86.95
89.56
86.82
86.80
88.30
89.54
87.68
88.31
89.72
87.68
88.21
89.68
87.68
88.07
89.64
87.67

FPR
6.30
1.50
1.54
2.53
0.60
1.19
2.13
0.50
1.19
2.11
1.30
2.20
2.06
1.40
2.20
1.10
1.40
2.03
1.24
1.37
0.35

From Table 11.3, we observe that there are minor differences between the
performances of the three methods when detecting normal class except in the case of the
DTree method with two features (i.e., 5 and 13), which has the least detection accuracy of
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93.68% for normal instances (and therefore, the highest false positive rate of 6.30%).
However, in this case we note that the DTree method yields relatively high detection
accuracies in detecting Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks. Further, the DTree method with
three features (5, 14, and 6) and four features (5, 14, 6, and 32) outperforms the NB and
ID3 methods in detection Probe and U2R attacks. In these cases, however, the DTree
method has relatively lower accuracies (68.91% with three features and 68.91% with four
features) in detecting DoS attacks. The reason for such low detection accuracies is that a
considerable number of DoS instances have been misclassified as Probe attacks. Such
misclassification, though undesirable, is better than the unacceptably low detection
accuracies for Probe attacks, achieved by NB and ID3 methods. In the rest of the cases
with five, six, seven, and eight features, the DTree method outperforms the NB and the
ID3 methods in detecting Probe and U2R attacks, yet maintaining very comparable
accuracies in detecting Normal, DoS, and R2L attacks.
11.3.2 Results with Unsupervised
MRMR Feature Selection
Table 11.4 gives the percentage attack detection accuracies and false positive
rates obtained by three methods: (1) DTree, (2) NB, and (3) ID3 on KDD Cup 1999
dataset. The features in Table 11.4 are obtained using the unsupervised MRMR feature
selection method.
From Table 11.4, we observe that the DTree method outperforms the NB and ID3
methods in detecting normal instances except in two cases: (1) the DTree method with
two features (23 and 24), and (2) the DTree method with three features (23, 24, and 5).
However, in both these cases, we note the detection accuracies of the DTree method are
considerably higher than the detection accuracies of NB and ID3 methods in detecting
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Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks. The DTree method with four features (23, 24, 5, and 33)
achieves detection accuracy as high as 42.11% for U2R attacks, which is significantly
higher than the detection accuracies of NB and ID3 methods for detecting U2R attacks
with four features. The DTree method with five features (23, 24, 5, 33, and 3) achieves
comparable detection accuracies for DoS, Probe, and U2R methods at a false positive rate
as low as 0.5%, which is considerably lower than the false positive rate of NB and ID3
methods implemented with five features. The DTree method with six, seven, and eight
features achieves fine improvements in detecting normal instances but falls behind the
NB and ID3 methods in detecting Probe, U2R and R2L methods

Table 11.4 Results of Dependence Tree based anomaly detection (DTree), Naive
Bayes (NB) anomaly detection, and ID3 anomaly detection on KDD Cup 1999
features selected by the unsupervised MRMR feature selection method.
Features
23,24

23, 24, 5

23, 24, 5,
33
23, 24, 5,
33,3
23, 24, 5,
33,3,35

Method
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3

Normal
60.00
97.90
98.28
92.06
97.70
98.25
98.79
98.00
96.26
99.50
97.80
97.95
99.64
97.90
97.81

DoS
81.16
93.40
82.62
92.90
96.60
94.12
92.64
95.20
94.10
92.82
95.10
94.17
93.88
95.80
93.80

Probe
58.74
10.80
45.10
73.93
37.80
58.43
68.72
73.40
65.22
72.30
76.20
74.44
59.82
73.20
74.56

U2R
86.40
0
0
27.19
0
0
42.11
0
1.04
8.33
10.50
7.02
3.07
10.10
3.51

R2L
23.92
0
0
16.17
3.50
0.72
0.43
1.50
0.38
0.32
8.00
0.49
0.98
8.10
1.01

TAD
97.13
85.92
76.58
90.85
89.52
87.40
87.92
88.72
87.48
87.85
89.07
87.70
87.57
89.69
87.40

FPR
40.00
2.10
1.72
7.95
2.30
1.75
1.21
2.00
3.74
0.50
2.20
2.05
0.36
2.10
2.19

23, 24, 5,

DTree

99.70

93.62

61.69

3.07

0.98

87.45

0.30

33,3,35,
34
23, 24, 5,
33,3,35,
34,36

NB
ID3
DTree
NB
ID3

97.60
97.75
99.76
97.80
97.74

95.00
93.71
93.65
95.00
93.71

72.00
74.39
57.73
72.40
74.51

10.50
3.070
3.51
8.30
3.07

8.50
1.90
1.02
8.80
1.90

88.91
87.37
87.38
88.93
87.38

2.40
2.25
0.24
2.20
2.26
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11.4 Comparison with Other Studies on
KDD Cup 1999 Datasets
In Table 11.5, we compare the class-wise detection accuracies of dependence tree
based anomaly detection method with results reported in Song et al. [19] and Bouzida et
al. [18] over the KDD Cup 1999 dataset.
Table 11.5 Comparison of class-wise percentage detection accuracies and false
positive rates of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method with the
network attack detection methods reported in Bouzida et al. and Song et al.
Work

Classification Models
DTree with four supervised

Normal

DoS

Probe

U2R

R2L

FPR

97.87

68.91

91.14

12.28

0.02

2.13

97.89

93.83

81.18

12.28

0.02

2.11

97.95

93.83

81.93

9.65

0.02

2.06

98.90

93.82

77.20

9.21

0.04

1.10

98.76

93.81

68.24

9.21

0.02

1.24

98.79

92.64

68.72

42.11

0.43

1.21

99.50

92.82

72.30

8.33

0.32

0.50

99.70

93.62

61.69

3.07

0.98

0.30

99.76

93.65

57.73

3.51

1.02

0.24

99.5

97.01

72.01

6.60

1.21

0.5

99.50

97.14

74.40

7.91

0.80

0.5

99.49

97.31

74.70

4.39

5.84

0.51

99.00

97.25

66.80

6.58

0.01

1.00

MRMR selected features.
DTree with five supervised
MRMR selected features.
DTree with six supervised
MRMR selected features.
DTree with seven supervised
MRMR selected features.
DTree with eight supervised
Ours

MRMR selected features.
DTree with four unsupervised
MRMR selected features.
DTree with five unsupervised
MRMR selected features.
DTree with seven
unsupervised MRMR selected
features.
DTree with eight unsupervised
MRMR selected features.
Nearest neighbor classification
with 41 features.
Nearest neighbor classification

[18]

with 4 principal components.
C4.5 classification with 41
features.
C4.5 classification with 4
principal components.
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[19]

Genetic programming with lap
distance (8-4), age 10%.
Genetic programming with lap
distance (8-8), age 10%.
Genetic programming with lap
distance (16-4), age 10%.
Genetic programming with lap
distance (8-4), age 30%.
Genetic programming with lap
distance (16-4) age 30%.

99.7

95.36

48.5

10.10

0.2

0.30

98.0

95.6

55.4

18.0

3.4

2.0

98.7

95.7

55.1

10.2

1.8

1.3

99.1

95.36

62.6

9.2

1.6

0.92

98.6

95.5

56.5

11.4

0.8

1.4

In Table 11.5, we compare the results of dependence tree based anomaly detection
method with the results reported in two recent papers: (1) Bouzida et al. used nearest
neighbor classification and C4.5 decision tree with principal component analysis for to
detect attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 datasets and (2) Song et al. used dynamic
programming approach to detect attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 datasets. Although other
studies on intrusion detection using KDD Cup 1999 dataset exist (for example,
Sarasamma et al. [9][20]), the reason for choosing the works by Bouzida et al. and Song
et al. for comparison with the dependence tree based anomaly detection method is that
the false positive rates in these two works are considerably low and are comparable with
the false positive rates achieved by the dependence tree based anomaly detection method.
On the other hand, intrusion detection methods reported in Sarasamma et al. yielded an
unacceptably high false positive rate and therefore are excluded from the comparison.
The results in Table 11.5, show that at 0.5% false positive rate Bouzida et al.'s
nearest neighbor classification rule and C4.5 decision tree implemented on 41 features
achieve detection accuracies that are very similar to the detection accuracies of our
dependence tree based anomaly detection method with only five features selected through
unsupervised MRMR feature selection method. Further, Bouzida et al.'s C4.5 decision
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tree built on 4 principal components extracted from 41 features of the K D D Cup 1999

data, has a false positive rate 1.0% which is comparable to the false positive rate of the
dependence tree method with seven features selected through supervised MRMR feature
selection. In this case, however, our dependence tree based anomaly detection method
outperforms the C4.5 method in detecting probe and U2R attacks.
The results in Table 11.5 show that Song et al.'s genetic programming approach
with tap distance parameters (16-4) at age 10% and (16-4) at age 30% have 1.3% and
1.4% false positive rates, which are comparable to the 1.24% and 1.21% false positive
rate of our dependence tree method with eight features selected through supervised
MRMR feature selection and the dependence tree method with four features selected
through unsupervised MRMR feature selection, respectively. We note that both these
dependence trees outperform Song et al.'s genetic programming models with tap distance
(16-4) in detection probe and U2R attacks. Similarly, we note that the dependence tree
models outperform the remaining genetic programming models from Song et al. with tap
distances (8-4) and (8-8) at ages 10% and 30% in detecting probe and U2R attacks, while
no significant differences in the detection accuracies for DoS attacks have been observed
between Song et al.'s models and our dependence trees.

CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this dissertation, we developed two novel pattern recognition methods: (1) the
K-Means+ID3, and (2) the dependence tree method for supervised anomaly detection.
The first method, K-Means+ID3, was developed to classify data instances into normal or
anomaly classes. To detect anomaly data instances, the K-Means+ID3 method first
partitions the training data instances into k disjoint clusters. Then, an ID3 decision tree
built on each cluster learns the sub-groups within the cluster and partitions the decision
space into finer classification regions, thereby improving the overall classification
performance. We compared the performance of K-Means+ID3 method with the
individual k-means and ID3 methods in terms of six performance measures. Results on
network anomaly data, Duffing equation data, and mechanical system data showed that
1. the K-Means+ID3 method outperforms individual k-Means and the ID3 methods
in terms of six performance measures over the 1998 network anomaly data,
2. the K-Means+ID3 has a very high detection accuracy (99.12 percent) and AUC
performance (0.96) over the 1999 network anomaly data,
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3. the K-Means+ID3 method shows better false positive rate and precision as
compared to the individual k-Means and the ID3 methods over the 2000 network
anomaly data,
4. the false positive rate, precision, and F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 method is
higher than the k-Means method and lower than the ID3 method over the Duffing
equation data, and
5. the K-Means+ID3 method has the highest precision and F-Measure over the
mechanical system data.
Future research directions pertaining to the K-Mean+ID3 method include: (1)
developing theoretical error bounds for K-Measn+ID3 method, and (2) comparing the
performance of K-Means+ID3 with cascading classifiers developed using different
clustering methods like hierarchical clustering, adaptive resonance theory (ART) neural
networks, Kohonen's self-organizing maps and decision trees like C4.5 and Classification
And Regression Trees (CART).
The second method, dependence tree based anomaly detection, was developed to
classify network traffic data instances into one of normal, denial-of-service attack,
probing attack, user-to-root attack, or remote-to-login attack. The dependence tree based
anomaly detection method used Bayes classification rule to classify data instances into
normal or one of the four attack types. Dependence trees were implemented to
approximate class conditional densities in the Bayes classification rule. For improving the
classification performance of dependence tree based anomaly detection, supervised and
unsupervised Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection
was used to select features that optimally characterize the class information. We derived
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the theoretical relationship between Bayes error rate, dependence tree based classification
error, and MRMR feature selection criterion and showed that both dependence tree
approximation and MRMR feature selection criterion minimize an upper bound on the
Bayes error rate. The performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection
method was demonstrated on the benchmark KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Further, the
performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method was compared with
the performance of the naive Bayes and the ID3 decision tree methods as well as with the
nearest neighbor rule and C4.5 decision trees presented in [18] and the genetic
programming approach presented in [19]. Our results showed that
1.

the dependence tree based anomaly detection method with five and six features
selected through supervised MRMR feature selection method outperforms the
naive Bayes classifier and the ID3 decision tree method in detecting probe and
U2R attacks,

2.

the dependence tree based anomaly detection method with four features selected
through unsupervised MRMR feature selection method achieves U2R attack
detection accuracy as high as 42.11% at 1.21% false positive rate, outperforming
both the naive Bayes and the ID3 methods in detecting U2R attacks, and

3.

the dependence tree based anomaly detection method outperforms Song et al. 's
[19] genetic programming based anomaly detection models in detecting both
probe and U2R attacks, while maintaining high detection accuracies in detecting
normal and denial-of-service attacks.
Future research directions pertaining to our dependence tree based anomaly

detection work include (1) using robust kernel density estimators for estimating the class
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entropy of and mutual information between features and (2) modifying the M R M R

feature selection criterion by adding a weight matrix to represent

different

misclassification costs so that the features selected through the modified feature selection
criterion take into account the misclassification costs that may be incurred during
classification.
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